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Summary
Identification of threats to organisations and risk assessment often takes into
consideration the pure technical aspects, overlooking the vulnerabilities origi-
nating from attacks on a social level, for example social engineering, and ab-
stracting away the physical infrastructure. However, attacks on organisations
are far from being purely technical. After all, organisations consist of employ-
ees. Often the human factor appears to be the weakest point in the security
of organisations. It may be easier to break through a system using a social
engineering attack rather than a pure technological one. The StuxNet attack is
only one of the many examples showing that vulnerabilities of organisations are
increasingly exploited on different levels including the human factor. There is an
urgent need for integration between the technical and social aspects of systems
in assessing their security. Such an integration would close this gap, however, it
would also result in complicating the formal treatment and automatic identifi-
cation of attacks.
This dissertation shows that applying a system modelling approach to socio-
technical systems can be used for identifying attacks on organisations, which
exploit various levels of the vulnerabilities of the systems. In support of this
claim we present a modelling framework, which combines many features. Based
on a graph, the framework presents the physical infrastructure of an organi-
sation, where actors and data are modelled as nodes in this graph. Based on
the semantics of the underlying process calculus, we develop a formal analytical
approach that generates attack trees from the model.
The overall goal of the framework is to predict, prioritise and minimise the
vulnerabilities in organisations by prohibiting the overall attack or at least in-
ii
creasing the difficulty and cost of fulfilling it. We validate our approach using
scenarios from IPTV and Cloud Infrastructure case studies.
Resumé
Identifikation af trusler mod organisationer samt risikoanalyse tager ofte kun
højde for de rent tekniske aspekter og overser derved svagheder, der stammer
fra angreb på et socialt niveau, f.eks. social engineering, og som abstraherer
den fysiske infrastruktur væk. Imidlertid er angreb på organisationer langt fra
udelukkende af teknisk karakter. Ofte viser det sig, at den menneskelige faktor
er det svageste punkt i organisationers sikkerhed. Det kan være lettere at bryde
igennem et system ved hjælp af et social engineering-angreb i stedet for med
et rent teknisk angreb. StuxNet-angrebet er et af mange eksempler, der viser,
at svagheder i organisationer i stigende grad bliver udnyttet på flere niveauer,
herunder udnyttelse af den menneskelige faktor. Der er et presserende behov
for integration mellem de tekniske og sociale aspekter af systemer, når deres
sikkerhed bliver vurderet. En sådan integration ville lukke dette gab, men ville
også komplicere den formelle behandling og automatiske identifikation af angreb.
Denne afhandling viser, at en systemmodellerings-fremgang anvendt på socio-
tekniske systemer kan bruges til at identificere angreb på organisationer, som
udnytter forskellige niveauer af svagheder i systemerne. For at understøtte den-
ne påstand præsenterer vi et modellerings-framework, som kombinerer mange
funktioner. Baseret på en graf præsenterer frameworket den fysiske infrastruk-
tur af en organisation, hvor aktører og data er modelleret som knuder i grafen.
Baseret på semantikken af den underliggende proces-kalkyle udarbejder vi en
formel analytisk tilgang, som genererer angrebstræer ud fra modellen.
Det overordnede mål for frameworket er at forudse, prioritere og minimere svag-
hederne i organisationer ved at forhindre det overordnede angreb, eller ved at for-
øge sværhedsgraden og omkostningerne ved at udføre angrebet. Vi validerer vo-
res tilgang ved at bruge scenarier fra casestudier af IPTV og Cloud-infrastruktur.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Organisations are a big, quickly changing mixture of technical and social parts -
socio-technical systems. Such systems can be attacked on different levels, com-
bining attacks from both the technical and the social part. While the technical
aspect of security is well understood, the social part is only partially so. The
real problem, however, is the fact that the combination of these two is yet to be
understood. Because of this it is hard to identify attacks exploiting the different
levels of organisations’ vulnerabilities.
In this thesis we show that applying a formal modelling approach to the study
of socio-technical systems allows one to develop algorithms for the automated
identification of complex attacks that exploit the interplay between technological
and social vulnerabilities.
1.1 Challenge
Organisations need employees - they are the main driving force of contribution
to the success and the development of the organisations. At the same time, the
human factor poses difficult problems for organisations. By their very nature,
employees have access to and knowledge about the organisation’s infrastructure,
data, and work-flows, and they use these in their everyday work to fulfil tasks.
2 Introduction
Determining whether a certain action by an employee is legitimate (regular
work) or illegitimate (insider attack), is close to impossible because the insider’s
purpose for performing the action is not observable. This problem exists both
if the action involves assets that the employee is not allowed to access, and even
more so, if the access to the asset is allowed.
Organisations often distinguish between threats originating from the inside and
the outside. While this in principle makes sense (and many organisations are
much better prepared against attacks from the outside than against those from
the inside), it is also risky. If an outsider is able to get an insider to perform a cer-
tain action, the insider becomes, voluntarily or involuntarily, part of the attack.
Social engineering is a typical kind of attack used in these scenarios [MS03]; it
aims at making an insider perform an action that he is allowed to perform, were
it part of his daily work.
For various reasons, neither regulating insider actions nor surveilling them are
viable options. Over-regulation easily results in disgruntled employees, and the
human mind can be ingenious when having to circumvent security precautions
and policies. Over-surveillance, on the other hand, is illegal in many parts of
the world, and even if it is admissible, it is unclear how to draw meaningful
conclusions from huge amounts of the logged or observed data. The risk of both
false positives and false negatives easily becomes too high.
What seems like a viable option is to analyse an organisation’s vulnerability con-
sidering the human factor before an attack, or to use tool support after an attack
to narrow down which actions might have occurred as part of the attack [PH08].
Traditional and well-established risk assessment methods can often identify these
potential threats, but due to a technical focus, these approaches often abstract
away the internal structure of an organisation and ignore human factors when
modelling and assessing attacks. To support the threat analysis of organisa-
tions, several system models have been introduced that model organisations’
infrastructure and actors. Examples for such models include ExASyM [PH08],
Portunes [DPH10a], and ANKH [Pie11a]. All these models follow similar ideas,
namely the modelling of infrastructure and data, and analysing the modelled
organisation for possible attacks.
The system models mentioned above have an important shortcoming: the at-
tacker model and the attacker behaviour are tightly integrated into the sys-
tem model and the analysis. This is an undesirable property; it means that
experimenting with different behaviours and types of insiders is close to im-
possible [Col09]. It is exactly this tight integration that hampers the models’
applicability to analyses of an organisation’s vulnerability to different kinds of
attacks. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the effect of changed
employee behaviour.
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1.2 Thesis Contribution
The core contribution of this thesis is to show that applying a formal modelling
approach to the study of socio-technical systems allows one to develop algorithms
for the automated identification of complex attacks that exploit the interplay
between technological and social vulnerabilities.
In order to address the challenge of identifying attacks that exploit organisa-
tional vulnerabilities on all different levels of a socio-technical system, namely
physical infrastructure, human actors, policies, and processes, we develop a
modelling framework where all these relevant aspects of socio-technical systems
coexist seamlessly.
We explore different approaches to tackle the problem of defining human be-
haviour. One approach is to formally model human behaviour as an independent
component in the system model. Doing so we aim at enabling behaviour-based
analysis which would result in more flexibility compared to existing studies.
Due to the irrationality and unpredictability of humans, this proves to be prac-
tically impossible. Instead, we try to apply fundamental sociological methods
to explain human behaviour using higher order logic. While this approach can
contribute to the validation of the attack generation, it still does not properly
encompass the irrationality of people.
Our approach models the organisation under scrutiny using a process calculus
from the Klaim family [DFP98b; GP03; PHN07a]. This model contains all
relevant aspects of a socio-technical system. It also specifies access control
policies and trust relations. When evaluating our techniques, we also discuss
the apparent problem of obtaining precise models of these properties.
Once the organisation has been modelled, the algorithm based on policy inval-
idation we propose identifies ways to break a policy in this model. The policy
to invalidate can be specified as part of the model, or we try to invalidate all
policies in the model. The former approach results in a relatively targeted set
of attacks, while the latter, though exhaustive, may contain many attacks that
are not of interest.
The attacks discovered by our policy invalidation algorithm are represented in
the form of an attack tree. Attack trees [Sch99; KPS14] are widely used by
various security analysis techniques; they support an easily accessible tree-like
structure that can be visualised and understood by non-experts. At the same
time, they can be subjected to formal analysis and structured treatment due
to their tree-structure. Standard attack trees represent sub-goals that must be
completed in a specific sequence, they have a hierarchical structure: the root
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node represents the attacker’s goal, which is further refined by defining sub-
goals. As mentioned above, the sub-goals can be represented as sub-trees in the
overall attack tree, where sub-trees, i.e., sub-goals, are combined conjunctively
or disjunctively.
While attack trees for purely technical attacks may be constructed by automated
means [VNN14], for example by scanning networks and identifying software
versions, this is currently not possible for attacks exploiting the human factors.
Actually, only few, if any, approaches to systematic risk assessment take such
“human factor”-based attacks into consideration. In this work we suggest the
use of system models to systematically generate attack trees for attacks that
may include elements of human behaviour. These attack trees can then be
used as input to a traditional risk assessment process and thereby extend and
support the brainstorming results. We extend previous work [KW13; KW14]
by describing a systematic approach for the generation of attack trees from a
system model. The generated attack trees are complete with respect to the
model, that is, our method identifies all attacks that are possible in the model.
This is achieved by basing the attack tree generation on invalidation of policies;
policies in our model describe both access control to locations and data, as well
as system-wide policies such as admissible actions and actor behaviour.
1.3 List of Publications
The work in this thesis has contributed to deliverables in the TRESPASS project
and has also resulted in the following publications:
• Marieta G. Ivanova, Christian W. Probst, René Rydhof Hansen, and Flo-
rian Kammüller: “Externalizing behaviour for analysing system models”
at Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST) 2013 [Iva+13]
This paper introduces the externalisation of the behaviour in system mod-
els as a separate component, thus providing flexibility to the analysis to
simulate different kinds of attackers.
• Jaap Boender, Marieta G. Ivanova, Florian Kammüller, and Giuseppe
Primiero: “Modeling human behaviour with higher order logic: in-
sider threats” at Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST)
2014 [Boe+14]
The paper aims at applying a fundamental theory from sociology in an
attempt to model human behaviour. As a case study we present the mod-
elling and analysis of insider threats in the context of an organisation.
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• Michael Nidd, Marieta G. Ivanova, Christian W. Probst, and Axel Tan-
ner: “Tool-based risk assessment of cloud infrastructures as socio-technical
systems” at The Cloud Security Ecosystem, Chapter 22 2015 [Nid+15]
This book chapter illustrates how we apply our modelling approach to a
cloud environment seen as a socio-technical system.
• Zaruhi Aslanyan, Marieta G. Ivanova, Flemming Nielson, and Christian
W Probst: “Modelling and Analysing Socio-Technical Systems” at Socio-
Technical Perspective in IS development (STPIS) 2015 [Asl+15]
The poster presents an overview of the modelling process, the attack gen-
eration, and a technique for further quantitative analysis of an attack tree.
• Marieta G. Ivanova, Christian W. Probst, René Rydhof Hansen, and
Florian Kammüller: “Attack tree generation by policy invalidation”
at Conference on Information Security Theory and Practice (WISTP)
2015 [Iva+15a]
The paper describes the analytical approach to attack generation from a
system model.
• Marieta G. Ivanova, Christian W. Probst, René Rydhof Hansen, and Flo-
rian Kammüller: “Transforming Graphical System Models to Graphical
Attack Models” atGraphical Models for Security (GraMSec) 2015 [Iva+15b]
The paper illustrates the graphical transformations applied on a system
model in order to derive different attack vectors from that model, which
are combined into an attack tree.
• Jan-Willem Bullee, Marieta G. Ivanova, Lorena Montoya, Christian W.
Probst: “Literature Review on Socio-technical Security Models”, In prepa-
ration for submission. [Bul+]
A systematic literature review summarising work in the field of socio-
technical security models.
1.4 Synopsis
For a better overview of this dissertation, a brief account of the chapters is
presented below.
Chapter 2 starts with introducing the main background concepts. The core
part of the chapter reviews existing literature on system modelling approaches,
in particular those that focus on the attacker model and organisational infras-
tructure. In addition, the chapter reviews literature on policy languages, process
modelling and attack generation techniques.
Chapter 3 briefly presents a running example, which we refer to throughout
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the subsequent chapters. The chapter describes the concepts of our framework,
focusing on externalising the human behaviour and describing the kinds of poli-
cies and the policy language used. Later in the chapter we illustrate them on
the running example and conclude with a short discussion on the content of the
chapter.
Chapter 4 presents the formalism behind the concepts described in Chapter 3.
Using a variation of the Klaim language, we present the syntax of the process
calculus. We also describe the semantics and the reference monitors used.
Chapter 5 describes the techniques of identifying attacks from the model. First,
we illustrate graphical transformations of a system model to an attack tree. Af-
ter that, we present the technique of generating the attack trees by invalidating
policies in the system model.
Chapter 6 presents the cloud case study and how the techniques presented in
this work are applied on it. Moreover, the work presented in this dissertation is
compared to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 7 presents some concluding remarks and depicts open questions and
improvements as future work.
1.5 TREsPASS Project Acknowledgements
Part of the research leading to these results has received funding from the Eu-
ropean Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant
agreement no. 318003 (TRESPASS). This publication reflects only the authors’
views and the Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the informa-
tion contained herein.
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter we describe related work on relevant topics. Before presenting
it, we start with describing the background concepts.
In Section 2.2 we summarise the insights from a systematic literature review
on socio-technical security models. It not only gave us the overview, but also
served as a source of motivation for the research presented in this dissertation.
Referring to the available work, that has been done in the area of organisational
security, helped us identify the need of addressing the issues of the interplay
between the technical and the social aspects of organisational vulnerabilities.
As policies play a vital role in our approach, both in the modelling part, and
in the attack generation, in Section 2.4 we shortly present the types of access
control policies and point the most popular policy specification languages.
Finally, in Section 2.5 we present existing work on attack tree generation tech-
niques - a research area, that has been of increasing interest in the recent years
both in academia and industry.
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2.1 Background Concepts
In this section we introduce the core concepts used in this dissertation. We give
simple examples where applicable and elaborate shortly on how these concepts
are used in our work.
2.1.1 Socio-technical Systems
The term “socio-technical system” itself dates back to the end of World War
II [ET60]. It has been realised that in an organisation it is not only about the
technical part, but the social aspects are also important. Back then the concept
was introduced in order to design an organisation in a way so it can unfold its
potential and reach higher efficiency. Nowadays, seeing organisations as socio-
technical systems is also beneficial for modelling the security of organisations.
Organisations constantly change and evolve. Some have hierarchical structures,
while others have decentralised structures where each part is a semi-autonomous
unit. However, no matter the structure, organisations always involve both the
technical aspect as well as the social one.
Socio-technical systems pertain to theory regarding the social aspects of people
and technical aspects of organisational structure and processes. “Technical” is
a term used to refer to structure and a broader sense of technicalities. Socio-
technical refers to the interrelatedness of social and technical aspects of an
organisation.
Organisational security is a difficult problem in general and even more com-
plicated when we talk about organisations as socio-technical systems. Many
attacks, however, exploit organisational vulnerabilities on different levels. One
of the many examples is the German steel mill incident, where a malicious actor
has managed to infiltrate a steel facility [LAC14]. The attack involved other
stages and required ICS knowledge, but the most crucial step turned out to be
gaining access to the corporate network by using a spear phishing email, and
respectively from there moved to the plant network.
Such examples clearly show that the human vulnerability possibly leads to a
greater damage, which could sometimes even be catastrophic. There are many
more examples reflecting the difficulty of securing socio-technical systems due
to the interplay between the human factor and the technical aspect.
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2.1.2 System Models
The term system model has a rather broad meaning. In the context of this disser-
tation we will use it for referring to an abstract representation of socio-technical
systems formalised by an underlying process calculus. A given organisation can
be presented by different system models, depending on the perspective. In this
thesis we consider organisations as socio-technical systems, which include com-
ponents as described below. In other words a system model describes all the
relevant components of such a socio-technical system. These involve the physi-
cal infrastructure, the human factor, the policies, the processes, the items, and
the data assets.
For a better overview, one could think of the system model’s components ad-
dressing the following main layers:
• physical layer which represents the physical infrastructure of the organisa-
tion, in terms of buildings, rooms, doors, etc., and their interconnections.
It is conceptually similar to a blueprint of the buildings of an organisation.
This layer also includes physical items.
• technical layer refers to elements from the network domain (e.g., com-
puters, servers) as well as their logical connections. It also involves the
processes, which represent the dynamics of this layer. Data assets belong
to the technical layer too (e.g., a file stored on a server).
• access control layer defines the access rules in both the physical and the
technical layer. We model this layer with the use of policies. The corre-
sponding policy specification language we use is described in Section 3.3.
• social layer involving the actors, together with their role in the organisa-
tions, access rights they have, their knowledge in terms of data, and items
they possess.
With the above being said, we would like to note that throughout this thesis a
system model of an organisation would then refer to a single instance of the sys-
tem model, i.e., a specific organisation modelled using our modelling approach.
As a domain language for both the physical, the technical and the social layer,
we use the process calculus presented in Chapter 4. We provide more elaborate
descriptions of the system model components in the dedicated Chapter 3.
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2.1.3 Security Policies
The American Heritage Dictionary from 1982 defines a policy as a plan or course
of action designed to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other mat-
ters [82]. Consequently, in 2002, Bishop defines the goal of a security policy as
to maintain the security of critical information, in terms of integrity, confiden-
tiality, and availability of those information resources [Bis02].
Integrity ensures information is consistent, accurate, and trustworthy. Confiden-
tiality is concerned with preventing sensitive information from being reached by
the wrong users while making sure authorised users can get it. Finally, availabil-
ity deals with guaranteeing reliable access to information by authorised people.
The above security properties are achieved by applying different security mech-
anisms, most often authentication, access control and auditing. Authentication
is the process of ensuring that the user (subject) is the one it is declared to
be. There are two types of access control - physical and logical. Regardless
of the type, the technique is used to restrict access only to authorised users
to view and/or operate the information. Finally, auditing of logs and records
made primarily by the implemented security mechanisms facilitates after-the-
fact analysis of security breaches and may be used to establish which entities
are responsible for a breach.
In order to give a better overview of the different types of security policies, we
refer to a framework proposed by Sterne [Ste91]. According to it, a security
policy falls into one of the three categories mentioned below:
• security policy objective which may be considered an overarching goal or a
“mission statement” for information security. A security policy objective
defines, at a high level, which information resources to protect and what to
protect them against; it does not prescribe specific protection mechanisms
or describe technical details of attacks. An example of a security policy
objective might be ‘maximum network availability should be maintained
at all times’. While these statements are important, they are very high
level and provide limited opportunities for further analysis in the context
of this dissertation.
• organisational security policy, which delves into more details with security
rules, mechanisms, and practices in order to support the security policy
objectives set out by an organisation. The organisational security policies
are also a natural place to import, implement, and codify all the relevant
legislation and compliance measures related to managing and protecting
an organisation’s information resources. This requires defining criteria
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for authorising individual users, user roles, conditions for delegation of
authority, etc. An organisational security policy is meaningful as long as it
provides individuals reasonable ability to determine whether their actions
violate or comply with the policy. Continuing the example above, an
organisation might declare that only senior staff members should be given
a key to the company premises. This would be supporting the security
policy objective of maintaining maximum network availability at all times
because it limits the number of people potentially having physical access
to the building in which such network equipment is located.
• automated security policy, which operates at the (low) technical level and
involves technical measures and mechanisms employed in order to imple-
ment and support organisational security policies. Examples include the
access rules defined in a network gateway or firewall to enforce network
separation and control.
Policies play a central role in the modelling approach as well as the analysis
and attack tree generation presented in this thesis. In Section 3.3 we describe
how we relate the aforementioned categories of security policies in the policy-
specification language we present.
2.1.4 Attack Trees
Attack trees represent attacks in a hierarchical structure with the goal of the
attack being the root of the attack tree. Leaves represent the basic actions of
attacks, while the intermediate nodes are sub-goals combining the basic actions
either conjunctively or disjunctively. The “OR” nodes describe different alter-
natives, i.e., one satisfied sub-goal is enough, and the “AND” nodes describe the
steps needed for a successful attack, i.e., all the sub-goals of an “AND” node
should be satisfied for the goal to be achieved. In this dissertation every node
is an “OR” node unless it is marked as an “AND” node with the help of a bent
line.
Attack trees are widely used both in industry and academia due to their broad
usability. They are informative and descriptive, accessible for non-experts, while
at the same time they can be assigned a formal semantics that allows scientific
analysis. Based on the analysis, practitioners can then define actions which can
reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities.
In Figure 2.1 we show a simplistic attack tree. The root defines the goal of
the attack, namely, to steal a treasure from a bank. The goal is achieved by
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steal 
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guard
Figure 2.1: How to steal a treasure
getting the combination of the safe and either breaking into the bank or social
engineering the guard.
2.2 Socio-technical Security Models
The content of this section is based on a structured literature review in the area
of security modelling [Bul+]. In the review we address the research question:
“What features do current security models have?”. We shortly elaborate on the
methodology of the literature review and present a summary of the results.
2.2.1 Methodology
We have performed a systematic literature review [Kit04] to identify relevant
work on socio-technical security modelling languages, and to summarise the cur-
rent state of this topic and highlight the challenges. A review protocol describing
each step of the review, including eligibility criteria, was developed before be-
ginning the search for literature and the data extraction.
We considered articles covering aspects of security modelling of socio-technical
systems and keywords from the results of an initial search [Pie11a; SEH12;
DC04; DC05; Dra06; HP11; PH08; PH09b; Sam11; DFP98a; GP03; BLP02;
PHN07a; Mat+05; Mat+08; FLE09; DPH10b; Dim12; SBM03; Sco04]. These
articles covered 9 models, containing together 134 keywords, from which the
most relevant were selected and combined, to increase relevance of the query
results. The decisions on articles, keywords, and their combination were made
after intensive discussions with experts inside and outside of TRESPASS. As a
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result ten keywords were identified. The two most important keywords turned
out to be socio-technical and security modelling and the rest being as follows:
attack, cyber, cyber-attack, insider, model, scenario, vulnerability and vulnera-
bility analysis. In the end, we formed 28 search queries consisting of the two
most important keywords as well as a combination of two other keywords.
The inclusion criteria were defined in two parts. The first one requires the
study to be written in English, as it is the language being favoured by the
Scientific Community when it comes to published research work. The second
inclusion criterion, being established as directly answering the research question,
requires the study to deal with aspects of security modelling of socio-technical
systems. We identified a socio-technical security model as having the following
characteristics:
• models a part of an organisation
• takes at least two of the following into account: social, technical, business
or physical/spatial aspect, and
• has an attacker component, e.g., goal of an attack, probability of breaking
a component or distinguishing between benign and malicious users.
The search was applied to the SCOPUS database, which also covers publications
from Cambridge University Press, Elsevier, Springer, Wiley-Blackwell and the
IEEE. The automated search was carried out in 2013 and 2014, and the results
of the queries were filtered based on a first read of the article and an assessment
of inclusion criteria. We also scanned the reference lists of the papers in order to
identify relevant other sources. In addition we have interviewed domain experts
within TRESPASS and outside of the project, who have suggested examining
some additional studies. Even after querying the database, the domain experts
kept sending us studies to be potentially included in the analysis.
The rest of the sections in this chapter present a summary of the results obtained.
An overview of the results can be found in Table 2.1.
2.2.2 Representation
The approaches considered in this review represent models either graphically or
textually. The graphical models can be divided in tree and graph structures,
diagrams, and map overviews.
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The tree structured models include the work by Dragovic et al. [DC05] and
Scott et al. [Sco04], where trees represent the world, and the MsAMS frame-
work [FLE09], where trees represent network topologies. Attack trees model
all steps that need to be taken to achieve the main goal of the attack [KOS13;
PDP13a; TML10; VVM12]. Alternatively, attack patterns describe generic ap-
proaches used by attackers [KOS13]. Finally, fault trees are used to represent
failure information about systems [VVM12]. Boolean logic Driven Markov Pro-
cesses are an extension of Fault Tree with Markov processes [KBP12].
Graph structures are used to construct Capability Acquisition Graphs, presented
by a tuple consisting of Vertices, Edges and System properties [Mat+08]. In
the CySeMol model, the graph structure is used in a Reachability graph to
link steps in an attack [SEJ10; SEH12]. Hyper graphs are used in the ANKH
model to represent membership of a group [Pie11b] and in the MsAMS language
to define broadcast communications [FLE09]. Portunes [DPH10b; Dim12] and
ExASym [PHN07a; PH08; PH09b] use directed graphs to connect data or places
of interest in the model. A totally ordered graph is used to represent coordinated
attacks [Sam+13]. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) are used to model Attack
Graphs, containing paths an attacker could use to achieve his goal [Xie+09;
Sar+14], and directed bipartite graphs are used to visualise Petri Nets, and are
well suited for modelling distributed systems and concurrent behaviour [SF93].
Diagrams also come in different flavours. Attack sequence diagrams describe an
intrusion from the intruder’s point of view as a sequence of ordered steps. Each
step describes an attacking activity to be used [KOS13]. Data flow diagrams
are used to create threat models [Sho08]. Misuse case maps focus on vulnera-
bilities, threats and intrusions from an architectural point of view, and are an
extension of Use Cases, with security elements [KOS13]. The related Misuse
sequence diagram graphically shows an intrusion sequence as a combination of
misuse cases and UML sequence diagrams, helping to analyse complex intrusion
scenarios [KOS13].
Finally, ExASyM uses a building blue print as basis for the model [PHN07a;
PH08; PH09b; Sam11]. Misuse case maps present security issues from an ar-
chitectural perspective. They combine perspectives from misuse cases and use
case maps, providing a combined overview of a software system’s architecture
and its behaviour by drawing usage scenarios paths (aka use cases) [KOS13].
Textual notations for models are often used for elements in models, for exam-
ple processes. The algebraic process calculus is an overview description of the
processes and communication of a system. This allows formal reasoning about
behaviour and the system. One example of an algebraic process calculus is
KLAIM, the Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility [DFP98a],
which is the basis for both ExASyM [PHN07a; PH08; PH09b; Sam11] and Por-
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tunes [DPH10b; Dim12]. The situational calculus is used to model and analyse
coordinated attacks [Sam+13], and temporal logic allows to reason about time
aspects [Sha+10].
2.2.3 Infrastructure
The vast majority of the studies that represent infrastructure (16 out of 20)
cover the digital layer in their modelling approach; a big portion of them model
both the physical and the digital world.
Ten et al. [TML10] deal with cyber-security of critical network infrastructures.
The study proposes a supervisory control and data acquisition security frame-
work with four major components: real-time monitoring, anomaly detection,
impact analysis and mitigation strategies (RAIM). Xie et al. [Xie+09] focus on
analysing network security vulnerabilities, therefore they consider the digital
layer of an infrastructure. Shahriari et al. [Sha+10] apply an actor-based lan-
guage using reactive objects (REBECA). The study deals with network security
on the Transport Protocol Layer. It models a typical network including client
and server. Aiming to diagrammatically represent complex hacker attacks from
multiple perspectives, the Hacker Attack Representation Method (HARM) by
Karpati et al. [KOS13] uses a combination of 6 modelling techniques. With
the help of the Misuse Case Maps (MUCM) the system architecture targeted
by a specific attack is modelled. Dragovic et al. [DC04; DC05; Dra06] work
in the field of information security and privacy protection in ubiquitous com-
puting. They model the world unifying the physical and the virtual realms.
Each instance in this world belongs to a container class, which can be physical,
intermediate, or virtual. The notion of infrastructure in ExASyM [PHN07a;
PH08; PH09b; Sam11] is represented as set of locations and connections. The
physical layer describes the architectural plan of the organisation being mod-
elled, e.g., how rooms are connected with each other. Similar to the physical
layer, ExASyM models network components and the connections between them.
The MsAMS modelling framework [FLE09] focuses on modelling networks and
is based on ambients that represent hosts, services, vulnerabilities, networks,
users, and even credentials. The social layer is also described as ambients inter-
acting with each other. Mathew et al. [Mat+05; Mat+08] model information
about the physical location and reachability of information assets on a net-
work. Even though the study is focused on network security, it considers both
the network infrastructure and physical aspects. Samarji et al. [Sam+13] focus
only on modelling system networks. Sommestad et al. [SEJ10; SEH12] model
information systems.
Only four of the modelling approaches in this literature review reflect all three
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types of infrastructure in their studies. Pieters et al. [Pie11b] model the physical
and digital infrastructures and also reason about access in system models includ-
ing human actions, and their graph-based reference model reflects all physical,
digital and social infrastructures. Scott et al. [Sco04] model the world as a nested
tree of entities, similar to ambients in the Ambient Calculus. Sorts are used as
constraints for how entities could be nested. The authors take into account the
physical world, the digital world, though modelled as physical objects, as well
as the actors, modelled as autonomous physical entities. In Portunes [DPH10b;
Dim12] the world is also divided in the physical, digital, and social layer. A
later study by Pieters et al. [PDP13a] is focused on alignment of policies from
different domains: access control, network layout, and physical infrastructure
as well as the social domain. While the study is not focused explicitly on mod-
elling these domains, they are still part of it as components of the policies being
aligned.
The only socio-technical model that focuses exclusively on the physical domain
is the STS model by Lenzini et al. [LMO15]. This approach models the infras-
tructure as a graph structure that gives rise to a labelled transition system (LTS)
capturing the infrastructure state, and evaluates security properties directly on
this LTS.
2.2.4 Assets and Containment
ExASyM [PHN07a; PH08; PH09b] considers the objects that the actors work
with or any data in general, be it located at actors or accessible at certain
locations. Pieters et al. [PDP13a] consider the assets of an organisation de-
scribed by high-level policies (“sales data should not leave the organisation”) as
well as desirable and undesirable states of those assets (“being in the hands
of competitors”). In low level policies individual actions of actors are con-
strained (“this door can only be opened with a specific key”). An earlier study
by Pieters et al. [Pie11b] faces an issue with the containment approach in the
case when there are different domains represented (physical, digital, and social)
and the physical and digital assets being modelled are combined. Assets in Por-
tunes [DPH10b; Dim12] can belong to the physical or digital domain, e.g., a
usb dongle and service data. Ten et al. [TML10] address cyber-security of criti-
cal infrastructures, especially electrical power infrastructure, thus they consider
cyber-assets of the power infrastructure including computer and communica-
tion devices installed in power plants, substations, energy control centres, etc.
Xie et al. [Xie+09] model network resources as assets. In the study by Dragovic
et al. [DC04; DC05; Dra06] the modelling of assets exhausts with modelling
data objects. Ambients in the MsAMS modelling framework [FLE09] are the
key components when modelling the world thus they are abstractions, which,
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among others, also represent assets. The studies by Mathew et al. [Mat+05;
Mat+08] are focused on information assets in a network. They refer mostly to
critical files, which are called “jewels”. When modelling coordinated attacks,
the study by Samarji et al. [Sam+13] allows resource sharing between attack-
ers, therefore different assets of a system could be threatened at the same time.
Sarkar et al. [Sar+14] model assets in the form of data or artefacts, and anno-
tations. In [SEJ10; SEH12] assets and their relation to each other are specified
and risk is estimated with regards to the assets in terms of probabilities (archi-
tectural meta-model and probabilistic dependencies).
We consider containment either as the containment of an object at a location,
or an object within another object. An example of the latter is a hard disk
within a PC.
Objects and actors can be modelled to be at a location. In this case, actors
also can travel within the infrastructure, gaining objects or performing ac-
tions [Pie11a; PHN07a; PH08; PH09b; DPH10b; Dim12; Sco04]. Similar to
the real world, actors can only travel within the physical infrastructure. An
actor can for example go to a room and get some object [PH09b], but not the
bits of digital file. However, there can be interaction with objects in the digital
infrastructure (e.g., by using a computer to start a process).
The second meaning of containment is an object within another object, whereas
the relationship between objects is more in the hierarchical sense. Such a kind
of relationship can be modelled by some of the approaches considered [KOS13;
DC04; DC05; FLE09; DPH10b; Dim12; Sco04; LMO15]. Examples include a
room within a building or a PC within a room, as well as the containment
of a digital object in a physical object [DC04; DC05; DPH10b; Dim12; Sco04].
Clearly this containment of digital objects in physical objects cannot be reversed,
that is data objects can not contain physical objects. Another approach is to
model everything as an ambient [FLE09] and use nesting. A company network
would be an ambient, containing other ambients, such as PCs, firewalls and
network routers.
2.2.5 Processes, Actions and Behaviour
Processes are generally defined as a sequence or flow of steps or actions. In the
context of socio-technical modelling this is a sequence of attack steps [KOS13;
Xie+09; Sam+13; PDP13a; SEJ10; SEH12; Zha+11; FLE09] or the (data) flow
through a system or application [KOS13; Sho08; Sar+14].
Processes are represented as part of a model in ExASyM [PHN07a; PH08;
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PH09b; Sam11], Portunes [DPH10b; Dim12] and Scott et al. [Sco04]. In the
model of Scott, software model checkers (e.g., Promela) ensure that processes
are being free of deadlocks, race conditions and that liveness properties hold.
By using attack trees, processes are used in a different way. The path through
the tree is a sequence of attack steps and therefore an attack path can be seen
as a process [TML10]. Extending the tree with Markov Processes ensures that
succeeding attack steps are executed [KBP12].
Actions Activities related to computing can be put in the environment of
an Ambient, including hosts, services, vulnerabilities, networks, users and cre-
dentials [FLE09]. The activities of mobile agents that react to changes in the
context are described by [Sco04], actions involving mobile agents are expressed
in: Out, In, Read, Eval and NewLoc [DFP98a].
Regarding vulnerabilities to the system, these are described in [TML10; Xie+09;
Zha+11]. Specific intrusion sequences, including interactions and message se-
quences are used in [KOS13].
Behaviour The expression of human behaviour in general is described in
terms of actions [Sco04; Pie11b] and how the user interacts with the system
and what processes are involved [KOS13].
Meta-attacks are described as attacker behaviour on a system, e.g., database
searches or unusual file deletion [Mat+08] or the expected behaviour and ac-
tions an attacker must perform to achieve the goal of the attack [VPH12;
KBP12; KOS13; VVM12; SEJ10; SEH12; Zha+11]. Also specific behaviour
is described, e.g., actors moving between locations in a physical infrastruc-
ture [DPH10b; Dim12; PH08; LMO15]. The actors in the model can perform
actions (e.g., change location or store data) [PH08], or move assets [DPH10b;
Dim12; LMO15]. Furthermore, attackers can start processes [Sha+10] and it is
assumed that they will pick attack steps that are related to their skills [Xie+09].
2.2.6 Actors
In ExASyM [PHN07a; PH08; PH09b; Sam11] actors can move in the infrastruc-
ture by following the connections between the locations. In ANKH [Pie11b], on
the other hand, humans and non-humans are treated symmetrically. There is
no need to distinguish between actors, objects, and credentials a priori. In the
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MsAMS framework [FLE09] basically everything is represented through an am-
bient, including the users. Scott et al. [Sco04] model actors as autonomous phys-
ical entities with the ability to move between rooms. Mathew et al. [Mat+05;
Mat+08] model users with different roles in order to evaluate their influence on
a network and detect possible violations. Since Karpati et al. [KOS13] represent
details about the actors in the system architecture in Misuse Case (MUC) dia-
grams, a colour notation is used to distinguish between “normal actors” (or “reg-
ular users”) and the attacker. Actors in Portunes [DPH10b; Dim12] are allowed
to move objects around and thus modify the graph representing the system. Ac-
tors are also able to interact with each other. Samarji et al. [Sam+13] present
the system in terms of predicates. The subject of an actor’s predicate is always
the ID, uniquely identifying actors. Actors in DASAI [Sar+14] can be humans or
automated agents. The agents in the system are assumed to be insiders. There
is also the possibility to model interaction between colluding agents. In contrast,
actors in [SEJ10; SEH12] are modelled as part of the architecture, regardless
of whether it is an outsider or insider. In their work Dragovic et al. [DC04;
DC05; Dra06] deal with information exposure threats where the threat does not
include a malicious intruder. In the STS model actors, including the intruder,
can act probabilistically and perform different actions (e.g., move or lock an
object) [LMO15].
2.2.7 Policies
Low level policies manage accessibility within an infrastructure. In this sense
they describe direct actions being allowed if certain conditions are satisfied.
ExASyM uses access control policies at locations. Actors need to comply with
the credentials in order to be able to perform the allowed actions specified in the
policy. The network attack model of Xie et al. [Xie+09] consists of attack states,
attackers, and attack rules. The attack rules describe the transitions between
attack states and define preconditions. For optimisation purposes, Dragovic
et al. [DC04; DC05; Dra06] assign policies to a given container class. In this
way a policy applies for each instance of the class thus avoiding unnecessary
repetition. Their studies deal mostly with policies concerning access control
and authorisation. As the world in the MsAMS framework [FLE09] is based
on ambients, the policies are embedded in the rules of the ambient. Samarji
et al. [Sam+13] do not define explicit policies. However, there is an implicit
approach by defining predicates, modelling the assets and the knowledge of
actors.
High level policies describe actions at an abstract meta-level. An example
of a high level policy is “all behaviours that have an undesirable outcome”.
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Pieters et al. [PDP13a] focus on formally identifying misalignments between
the different levels of policies, for example, access control policies and organi-
sational ones. Scott et al. [Sco04] consider mobility policies as well as global
security policies. A potential problem of conflicting policies is encountered and
a solution is proposed by describing suitable conflict resolution meta-policies.
In contrast to the majority of studies in this literature review, where policies
are used in order to ensure security and often attacks are derived by enforcing
the policies, in this study policies are used for controlling Sensient Mobile Ap-
plications at runtime as well as making the development of such applications
easier. The Portunes modelling language [DPH10b; Dim12] expresses policies
from physical and digital security by low level policies, and then introduces high
level policies in terms of security awareness.
2.2.8 Quantitative Measures
Quantitative measures are used to annotate model elements either during model
building or as a result of computations. The models can be annotated with
properties related to attackers and properties related to the owners of the sys-
tem. An important measure considered in studies is the probability of success
of a launched attack (step) [VVM12; SEJ10; SEH12]. In terms of risk man-
agement, the impact of an exploited vulnerability [Zha+11] and organisational
impact [Xie+09] of attacks are of interest.
Properties considered related to attackers include annotations of monetary costs
needed to perform an attack [KOS13; VVM12; Xie+09], the time needed to ex-
ecute an attack [KBP12], the needed skill for an attack [KOS13], vulnerability
exploitability of a system [Zha+11], and the necessity for special tools [VVM12].
Perhaps the most valuable annotation for an attacker is the risk of detec-
tion [KOS13; Xie+09].
2.2.9 Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures
ExASyM recognises possible attackers based on the analysis of the model and
presents them as sequence of actions.
Pieters et al. [PDP13a] provides the basis for existing and future methods for
finding security threats induced by misalignment of policies in socio-technical
systems. Attacks are generated from mismatches between global policies and
local ones. An attack is considered again as a sequence of actions.
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Ten et al. [TML10] evaluate system-, scenario-, and leaf-level vulnerabilities by
identifying the system adversary objectives. In their anomaly detection they use
event correlation techniques that are categorised as temporal, spatial, or hybrid.
The impact analysis evaluates the consequences of cyber-attacks on SCADA.
Mitigation strategies introduce security improvements of the most vulnerable
components of an attack scenario (presented as sequence of events).
Xie et al. [Xie+09] present an automatic generation of attack graphs. The
attack graph framework includes a host access graph and sub-attack graphs.
Each individual sub-attack graph presents the attack scenarios from one specific
source host to another specific target host. The host access graph presents the
access relationships between each pair of hosts.
Mathew et al. [Mat+05; Mat+08] use a static analysis tool to periodically con-
struct Capability Acquisition Graphs (CAGs) which are then analysed to un-
cover any possible attacks. Information about vulnerabilities in network services
is provided beforehand as an input to the tool. As the CAGs are generated pe-
riodically, there is potential for mitigation of attacks in the form of raising an
alert when an unauthorised privilege accumulation becomes apparent.
Shahriari et al. [Sha+10] show how an attacker can combine simple attacks
into multiphase attacks. The study uses a model checker for finding counter-
examples as violations.
The ST (CS)2 platform [AK12] aims to provide its users with guided cyber
security warnings based on the subscriber’s socio-technical security posture. As
opposed to the general cyber security warnings, which give only an overview of
the current situation, the authors talk about guided security warnings where the
threat level and the recommended countermeasures are customised depending
on the user’s socio-technical posture.
In another study vulnerability is modelled in the form of possible step-wise at-
tacks [Pie11b]. An attack is successful if the attacker gets access to a designated
asset.
Dragovic et al. [DC04; DC05; Dra06] focus on a subset of information leakage
threats, also called information exposure threats. In their system for autonomic
context-adaptive security, they focus on reasoning about the context. The re-
duction of the Level of Exposure (LoE) for all data objects is achieved by two
main protective actions: containment manipulation and information reduction.
The vulnerabilities are provided as an input component in MsAMS modelling
framework [FLE09]. Once the network is modelled, an attacker, who is also
represented as an ambient as all other components, is simulated dynamically.
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In this way an attack path is found, which is allowed by the modelled ambients
and their embedded rules.
Different approaches of modelling complex attacks from different perspectives
are used in HARM modelling technique [KOS13]. The study provides an inte-
grated view of security attacks and system architecture - misuse case maps and
misuse sequence diagrams.
In Portunes [DPH10b; Dim12] attacks are generated by finding inconsistencies
between the security policies in the different domains (physical, digital and
social). Respectively, an attack scenario could combine physical, digital and
social means of achieving his/her goals.
Samarji et al. [Sam+13] derive individual, coordinated (simultaneous) and con-
current attacks from the model. There are also types of attackers’ collaboration:
load accumulation, load distribution, role distribution. The study formally de-
scribes attacks by presenting the system state in terms of predicates. The au-
thors have chosen a pessimistic approach: in coordinated attacks, if a given
knowledge is required, it is enough that one of the actors has this knowledge.
In the study by Sommestad et al. [SEJ10; SEH12] vulnerabilities are threats
defined by domain experts as part of the model (both the abstract and the
concrete). An abstract model is defined as a base for a concrete model. Ad-
ditionally a meta-model is associated with a probabilistic model for evaluating
the security risk. Countermeasures are modelled with the aim of minimising the
risk. The study is focused on monetary loss from assets, but other application
domains are also possible.
In Sarkar et al. [Sar+14] the vulnerabilities are defined by domain experts and
serve as an input to the analysis tool. An attack model is first made by a
domain expert. Attack A is successful on a process P when there is a mapping
relation from A to P with certain conditions being satisfied, i.e., an attack is
successful if there is a “similarity match” between A and P. Countermeasures
work as follows: once an attack is found, improvement points in the process are
automatically identified (sorted by how heavily a certain step is attacked). P is
then evaluated to check whether the improvement was successful.
The STS model allows to evaluate security properties, such as the minimal cost
or the maximal probability of the intruder reaching a sensitive location or object,
using the probabilistic model checker PRISM [LMO15].
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2.3 Kinds of Attackers
Bishop et al. emphasise that the distinction between insider and outsider is not
a result from a binary function [Bis+10]. Instead, it is more realistic to distin-
guish between different kinds of attackers with respect to the level of insiderness.
These levels are based on different parameters such as access, knowledge, and
trust [Bis+10]. Mundie et al. also introduce different components in their at-
tempt to define an ontology for insider threat [HMP13].
The system models discussed in Section 2.2 consider only one single kind of
attackers. It is assumed that they know everything, i.e., they represent the
strongest possible attacker with respect to the model. This assumption is partly
justified by the fact that it is very hard to collect data to explain human be-
haviour. However, as discussed above, assuming a strongest possible attacker
also means that the analyses on system models will deem most organisations
to be vulnerable to most attacks. This happens because an attacker with legal
access to large parts of the organisation, such as a CEO or a cleaning lady,
also has the possibility to attack large parts of the organisation. In real life
this problem is solved by, e.g., trust or background checks. In the analyses of
system models, we need to assume that the actor might perform the actions,
thus raising an alert. Therefore we need other concepts in system models to
solve this problem [PH09a].
The Dolev-Yao attacker is the most powerful attacker when talking about pro-
tocol analysis [Cer01]. In the formalisms described above, the insider knows
how to get to any location, for example what key is needed to open a certain
door, where the key is located, and how to get it. In this case, we can think
metaphorically of a Dolev-Yao insider. However, such a kind of insider defines
the upper bound of the attacker’s abilities, which is not realistic in real life. In
addition, modelling such an attacker would make the system vulnerable to most
kinds of attack thus making the model useless. Instead we would like to define
different types of actors, i.e., actors with typical kinds of behaviour.
Some studies already exist that could provide the data to define typical kinds
of attackers. Magklaras et al. classify insider misuse as either intentional or
accidental [MF01]. A study shows that accidental security incidents by insiders
happen more often than malicious insider attacks [Gra09]. Existing research
on personality traits in relation to insider threats introduce a classification of
the insiders based on motivational categories. For instance, one category in the
topology is the explorer type. Driven by curiosity, they are benign and often
perpetrate without realising an attack [SPR99].
By defining separate groups of attackers it would be then possible to examine
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how vulnerable a system is towards different behaviours. One relevant evaluation
parameter is, for example, the likelihood of social engineering [MS03].
2.4 Policy-specification Languages
In this section we provide a short insight on the state-of-the-art of policy speci-
fication languages. For a more detailed discussion of their different features and
properties, we refer the reader to the relevant citation.
Most often in the literature access control policies are divided into three major
groups: discretionary, mandatory, and role-based.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts or permits access to objects
through an access control policy determined by the object’s owner group/sub-
ject. A typical example of DAC is the UNIX file mode.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) enforces access based on regulations by a
central authority (e.g., an operating system) and thus cannot be altered by an
end user.
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) as self-explaining, regulates the access by
using different roles, to which users belong to. An example could be any big
enterprise with a stable organisational structure.
The role-based access control policies are further refined into the following sub-
categories: trust-based access control (TrustBAC) [CR06], delegated role-based
access control (DeRBAC) [CK06; CK08], risk-aware role-based access control
(R2BAC) [CC12], risk-adaptive access control (RAdAC) [KSB11], and attribute-
based access control (ABAC) [Hu+14].
Among the most widely used policy-specification languages are XACML [XAC13],
DPL [LBN99], MRPL [Sco04], SPDL-2 [SBM03], SWIL [Sco04], PEAL [CHM13],
and Cassandra [BS04].
2.5 Attack Generation Techniques
As mentioned earlier, attack trees are widely used as a basis for automated
risk assessment tools. However, currently they are manually constructed by the
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domain experts relying on their knowledge and experience. While this could
work for small attack trees, when applied on big organisations, it becomes a
tedious and error-prone process. An automated attack tree generation can give
the practitioners large and correctly constructed attack trees, which are also
complete with regards to the underlying system model. Moreover, an automated
generation of attack trees enables the opportunity of reiterations in case of
system updates and changes.
There are some studies tackling this problem. In this section we summarise
the research we came across with, which addresses different aspects of attack
generation techniques, and more precisely generation of attack trees.
Attack representation models include attack graphs, attack trees, and variations
of attack trees: attack-defence trees, fault trees, etc. A major flaw of the at-
tack graphs is the state space explosion. A naive approach for an automatic
generation of attack trees, on the other side, is exponential in number of nodes.
A study by Kotenko et al. considers both technical and social aspects in se-
curity. However, it is more focused on information security, i.e., the technical
part is software-related. Even though there is a notion of physical access in the
constructed attack vectors, it is restricted only to control areas, neglecting the
physical infrastructure of the organisation in question [KSD11]. A serious prob-
lem, which the study has, is the exponential complexity of the security analysis,
which drastically decreases its usability.
Due to the lack of adequate attack tree generation techniques, combined with
the benefits from such an automation, this research gap has drawn great at-
tention and has become attractive for both researchers and industry practition-
ers [HKT13; VNN14; Pau14; PAV14; PAV15]
Hong et al. try to tackle the scalability problem using logic reduction tech-
niques in order to simplify the attack tree representation [HKT13]. The study
proposes two techniques. The first one is Full Path Calculation, where similar
nodes are grouped together. The second one is Incremental Path Calculation,
where the attack paths are recursively expanded in order to avoid node repeti-
tion. The simulations done successfully confirm the size reduction of the attack
trees, though there is a trade-off between construction time and memory usage.
Moreover, in a system where there are often updates, the overhead is repeated
every time, which could be time and computationally expensive. The biggest
issue, however, is the flattened structure of the attack trees, making the further
exploitation hard, if not impossible.
In their work, Pinchinat et al. synthesise attack trees based on a high-level
description of the system [PAV14]. They support high-level actions, playing
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the role of sub-goals, being further refined in the successive nodes in the attack
tree. Using GAL (Guarded Action Language), attack trees are then generated
using model checking. Follow up work from the same group introduces their
tool to support the earlier research [PAV15]. Even though high-level actions
help to reduce the complexity, it seems the scalability problem is still present
due to the combinatorics induced by the merging operator when constructing
the attack trees.
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Chapter 3
System Modelling
In this chapter we first introduce a running example on which to demonstrate
the modelling approach (Section 3.1), followed by a description of the model
components and their roles (Section 3.2).
As policies and processes play a key role in our system model, separate sections
are dedicated to them (Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, respectively). Throughout
the chapter we will refer to the running example in order to illustrate the model
components.
Finally, we discuss the work we have done in the direction of modelling the
human behaviour component in Section 3.5.
3.1 Running Example
Throughout this and the following chapters we will use a scenario from the IPTV
case study to illustrate our concepts [D1.3.2]. This case study describes a home-
payment system designed to support elderly people or people with disabilities,
who may have difficulty in leaving their home, in managing their own money.
Considering the target group, the system is integrated within an already familiar
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device, which makes it easy to use, and that is the television set.
An overview of the architecture of the system modelled in this case study is
shown in Figure 3.1. Due to confidentiality reasons, the technical details are
omitted, but the main features of the original case study have been retained.
The work presented in this dissertation has been applied on the original system
where similar results were obtained.
The architecture for delivering the service via the television is based on using
contact-less payments cards to authenticate users and provide payment capabil-
ities via a television remote control. The TV remote control is paired with an
IPTV set-top box, in order to support both the security and power management
requirements of the solution. The design offers the opportunity for people who
are not familiar or comfortable with mobile technology to receive the benefits of
the ever-increasing range of mobile services in their homes via their television
screen.
This case study provides the opportunity for exploring various security aspects,
ranging from the pure technical concerns, such as information transmission and
storage, to socio-technical ones, dealing with the use of and interaction with the
technology. Although this system could offer great convenience, it also has the
potential to expose the account holder to significant social risks.
The design behind the service has been adopted in order to support a range of
use cases. In the rest of this thesis we will be using one of the scenarios of the
IPTV case study. In particular we will explore its socio-technical features so as
to illustrate and validate the methods and tools we have developed.
3.2 Components Overview
We start by introducing the main concepts of a language, most of which are
illustrated on the running example in Section 3.6 below. The syntax and the
semantics of the formal language are covered in the following Chapter 4. The
model represents the infrastructure of organisations – both the physical and the
digital world – as nodes in a graph. These nodes can represent rooms, access
control points, and similar locations. Locations that are physically connected
are linked by directed edges in the graph, while logically connected locations
are connected with undirected edges. A location may belong to several do-
mains, e.g., a location can be part of the building and the network. In the
model, domains are used to limit where processes can move, e.g., human actors
are restricted to (physical) room nodes, computer processes are restricted to
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Figure 3.1: Physical system model of IPTV system
network nodes. Beyond these locations, the model has many other components:
Actors are also represented by nodes in the model and they move around in
the infrastructure. This also allows actors to share roles that can be used
in defining and checking policies.
Assets are used for modelling any kind of data or items, that are relevant in
the modelled organisation. Assets are represented by nodes that can be
attached to locations or to actors; assets attached to actors move around
with that actor.
Actions are performed by actors on a target, which can be any location in the
model, including physical locations or actors.
Policies are used in the model in a rather broad sense; they represent both
regulation of access to locations and data, and the behaviour as expected
by an organisation from its employees. Policies consist of required cre-
dentials and enabled actions. Credentials represent what an actor needs
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to provide in order to enable the actions governed by a policy. Enabled
actions represent the actions an actor is allowed to perform upon provid-
ing the required credentials. Each policy can consist of several pairs of
this kind. The policy-specification language is discussed in more detail
in Section 3.3.
Credentials can be a location the actor needs to be at, an identity the actor
needs to have, or data the actor needs to possess.
Processes are used to define the dynamics in the model. For example, ex-
changing data between interconnected devices is modelled with the help
of processes.
Our model is closely related to ExASyM [PH08] and Portunes [DPH10a], and
therefore also to Klaim [BLP02; NFP98; GP03]. While in Klaim process mo-
bility is modelled by processes moving from node to node, in our approach
processes reside in special nodes that move around with the process. We choose
this approach to make the modelling of (movement of) actors and items carried
by actors more intuitive and natural. For completeness we give the syntax and
semantics of our approach in Section 4.1 and Section 4.3 respectively.
Our model is expressive enough to model containment of items. Containment
represents for example the fact that a workstation contains a hard drive that
contains a file. In the formal language we use (described in the next chapter)
we would represent the workstation as an item with a location; this location
in turn would contain an item representing the hard drive; this item’s location
would contain data representing the (intangible) file.
We interpret containment as being transitive: if item a contains item b, and
item b contains the data d, then we say a contains d transitively, and b contains
d directly.
3.3 Policies
Policies are an important component of the socio-technical system model pre-
sented in the previous section. Policies play two roles. On one hand, in our
model we support two general mechanisms for modelling and enforcing security
policies, namely local and global policies. On the other hand, in addition to the
modelling, both local and global policies are at the core of the attack generation
presented in Chapter 5.
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In the model, local policies are concerned with the actions of discrete enti-
ties, e.g., single actors, and global policies are concerned with the overall system
state. After discussing local policies in Section 3.3.1, we cover global policies
in Section 3.3.2. Finally, we describe the syntax of our policy language in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Local Policies
Local policies consist of a set of required credentials and a set of actions that
are allowed when the required credentials are presented:
LocalPolicies = P (RequiredCredentials ×Actions)
Actions = P ({in, read,out,move, eval})
The actions come from the set of actions supported by the modelling formalism
acKlaim, presented in Chapter 4.
To ease the presentation, we formalise credentials as terms from the term algebra
over a suitable signature, yielding a flexible and expressive, yet simple, formali-
sation. The signature is chosen based on a concrete system model, and contains
enough structure to represent the model’s important features. In our running
example, we would expect the signature to at least contain such elements as
cards, pin codes, locations, accounts, and actor ids.
Since signatures are highly model-dependent, we merely assume the existence
of relevant signatures, Σ = (SΣ, FΣ), for the models we consider, where SΣ is
the set of sorts and FΣ is the set of function symbols over the sorts in SΣ. We
will not go into more details with defining signatures and term algebras here,
but refer instead to the comprehensive treatment by [MT92] (also, see below for
an example).
Thus, we can now give the formal definition of required credentials:
RequiredCredentials = P (T (Σ,Vars))
where T (Σ,Vars) is the term algebra generated by the signature Σ and variables
found in Vars. Variables are needed to express generic or parameterised policies.
An example for a local policy is the following:
({card(pin(X)), pin(X)} :{in})
It expresses that one needs a card with a PIN code, and the corresponding PIN
code for this card in order to be allowed to perform the in action at the protected
34 System Modelling
location. The set of credentials {card(pin(X)), pin(X)} represents the formal
way of the requirement that the actor should present a valid card (expressed
by card()), containing a PIN code (expressed by pin(X), where the variable X
denotes that the exact PIN code itself is irrelevant as long as there is one), and
should provide the relevant PIN code for this card (expressed by pin(X), where
the variable X is used to link back to the PIN code on the card).
The simplest possible signature for realising this local policy consists of a single
sort ? and the function symbols pin() and card() as well as the natural numbers
as constants (represented as 0-ary function symbols):
SΣ = {?} and FΣ = {card : ?→ ?, pin : ?→ ?, n : ?}
where n is a natural number.
This formalisation leaves the obvious question of how to determine if a set of
credentials presented by an actor is sufficient to meet the requirements of a
given policy. We start by formalising that the set of concrete credentials, i.e.,
credentials that can be provided by an actor, must be represented as a set of
ground terms from the term algebra that contain no variables:
ProvidedCredentials = P (T (Σ, ∅))
With this definition, we can use first order unification, as defined by Robin-
son [Rob65], to determine if a set C ∈ ProvidedCredentials of (concrete) cre-
dentials is valid with respect to a given set R ∈ RequiredCredentials of required
credentials: if C and R can be successfully unified (i.e., there exists a substi-
tution σ ∈ Subst : σR ⊆ C, where Subst = Vars → T (Σ, ∅) is the domain of
all substitutions from variables to ground terms), then the credentials C are
sufficient to satisfy the required credentials R of a given policy.
In our example we assume R = {card(pin(X)), pin(X)}. Using the unification-
based resolution, we can now determine whether the provided credentials
C = {card(pin(42)), pin(42)} would suffice to get permission to perform the
action in at the location being protected. It is not difficult to see that the sub-
stitution σ = [X 7→ 42] applied to R yields σR = {card(pin(42)), pin(42)} ⊆ C
and thus the action in is enabled.
The system model also supports predicates in credentials. Predicates are used to
establish facts about actors; in the example a predicate isEmployee could express
that the actor is an employee of the service provider, and isCustomer could
express that the actor is a customer of the company. Predicates are specified
in the model, and become part of the knowledge-base used in unification, and
consequently the term algebra.
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3.3.2 Global Policies
Global policies express system-wide policies that must be enforced everywhere,
at any time, in the system, i.e., they must hold in all states of the model. A
global policy describes a state or actions which are disallowed in the system,
and are expected to be enforced system-wide. While in practice there will be
many global policies, we assume without loss of generality that only one such
policy exists; for several policies our attack tree generation approach would
result in individual attack trees for each of the policies, and combine them
with disjunction nodes in the final attack tree. We assume two basic kinds of
organisational policies:
• Action-based global policies, which forbid actors to perform certain ac-
tions; and
• Location-based global policies, which forbid data to reach certain loca-
tions.
Action-based global policies are specified like local policies with required creden-
tials and a set of actions; they also contain an additional component identifying
the attacker, who can be an actor or a variable:
GlobalActionPolicies = (Actors ∪Vars)× RequiredCredentials ×Actions
Of course, the set of actions here specifies the prohibited actions. Location-
based global policies are considerably simpler, since they only specify an asset
and a location:
GlobalLocationPolicies = Asset × Location
In our model, the location-based global policies are a specialisation of action-
based global policies; for data to reach a location it either must be co-located
with an actor, who must have input the data, or it must have been output at
that location, which in turn again requires that an actor has input the data.
These policies can therefore be translated to an action-based global policy that
forbids inputing the data in question.
An example for an action-based global policy could forbid employees to reach
a certain location: ({X}, {isEmployee(X)}, {move(l)}). An example for a
location-based global policy could specify that a file containing credential data
must not leave the company’s premises: ({fileX}, {Outside}).
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3.3.3 Syntax Specification
Figure 3.2 presents the syntax of our policy specification language for both local
and global policies.
Local policies consist of pairs of credentials and actions. The semantics of these
pairs is that an actor must provide all the credentials in order to be allowed to
perform the respective actions. It is possible that one policy definition consists
of several pairs of credentials and actions. Each pair would then represent an
alternative policy.
Global policies specify an actor or a variable, which constrain whom the policy
should apply to, a set of credentials, and a set of actions, that actors are supposed
not to perform.
Credentials are represented by a set possibly containing items, data, identity,
location, or predicates. An item has an id and can contain other items or data,
and data has an id and must either have a value, or be bound to a variable. An
identity is matched against the actor’s identity, a location specifies where the
actor must be located to perform an action, and predicates support specification
of properties of actors.
Variables provide a further means to tie required credentials to provided creden-
tials, as well as policies to processes. We discuss the latter in the dedicated to
processes Section 3.4. It should be noted that variables are introduced for con-
venience; for finite models, one can just instantiate all variables with all possible
values in the policy definitions.
An enabled action can also take arguments, that either are values or variables
that are bound to values from the credentials that have enabled the action. The
eval action executes a process P with some arguments, and the move action
permits the actor to move to the location.
3.4 Processes
The notion of processes has been introduced to model the movement and ex-
change of data in the model. Similarly to the actors in the model, who can
move data with them from one location to another along the edges in the phys-
ical domain, data can move along the edges in the digital domain through the
processes. In other words processes govern the rules on how the data is handled
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LocalPolicies := ( credentials : actions )?
GlobalPolicies := ( ( actorID | variable ) , credentials , actions )?
credentials := ∅ | { ( item | data | location | actorID | pred ( argument? ) )? }
item := id ( ( ( item | data ) ) ) )?
data := id ( value | variable )
actions := ∅ | { ( in | out | move | eval )? }
in := in ( ( argument? ) )?
out := out ( ( argument? ) )?
eval := eval ( P ( argument? ) )?
move := move
argument := value | variable | _
Figure 3.2: The syntax of our policy language.
in these locations.
Processes are closely related to the notion of a tuple space, residing at each lo-
cation. A tuple space is a set of assets (data or items) and their corresponding
values. Processes, running at each location, perform various operations on a
tuple space relating to their own location, or some other location. Examples
of operations include writing data into a tuple space and reading data from
it (destructive and non-destructive read operation). Policies at corresponding
locations govern which of these tuple space operations are permitted, and pro-
cesses themselves govern the way in which the permitted tuple space operations
handle data.
Formally processes handle tuples of data – a set of parameters and their cor-
responding values without any particular structure or pre-defined values. The
tuple in the input process filters all the output requests at the current locations
and subsequent processes handle the way in which the tuple concerned is han-
dled at the location – it may be stored in the local tuple space, or a subsequent
action out may be launched to perform a write operation into a tuple space of
another location.
A process is typically a sequence of several sub-processes. The first sub-process
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is, as a rule, the input sub-process, which acts as a filter, filtering the tuple space
operations of interest. Other sub-processes in a sequence may be related to the
input sub-process by a sequential or parallel execution operator. For instance, a
process definition of in A .out B means that tuple space operations, matching
the credential A would match the input filtering rule. The sequential operator
dot (.) means that the subsequent output process will be applied to the data
received by the processes which were permitted to input some data into the
tuple space of a considered location. The output process outputs some data B
to the destination.
The enabling factor for tying policies and processes together, is the action out:
it enables actors with the right credentials to output a token in the tuple space
of the location protected by this policy. At the same location, one or more
processes can wait for “their” token by executing an action in, which blocks
until the expected input becomes available. In our running example, which is
presented in detail in Section 3.6, the policy at the bank account
({C} :{out(“transfer”, , , , )})
is tied to the process running at the bank computer (PC). When the credentials
of a certain account are provided, the process initiating the money transfer is
triggered.
in ((“transfer”, !amount, !myAccount, !myAccountCredentials, !receiver)) @C.
read ((“credentials”,myAccountCredentials)) @myAccount.
read ((“balance”, !balance)) @myAccount.
out ((“balance”, balance− amount)) @myAccount.
in (“balance”, !balance) @receiver.
out (“balance”, balance+ amount) @receiver
It should be noted that this approach also can model non-deterministic systems
by adding two or more processes that all wait for the same token.
3.5 The Human Component
In this section we describe work we have done in an attempt to express the
human component in our model. In Section 3.5.1 we illustrate restructuring of
our model so we can define the human behaviour as an independent component,
making the model parametric with respect to the behaviour. This would enable
the possibility to “plug-in” different kinds of behaviour and thus overcome the
restrictions of the existing modelling approaches. In Section 3.5.2 we present
another attempt - this time aiming to model human behaviour, by relating it to
a fundamental model in sociology, using higher order logic.
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As we will see towards the end of the chapter, the research presented in this
dissertation has evolved to a level, where light is shed onto the human behaviour
component only after the attack trees have been generated from the model. For
this reason, it also went out of the scope of our contribution to the TRESPASS
project. Nevertheless, in the very last Chapter 7, for clarity reasons, we describe
shortly the scope of our work in relation to the other project parts and discuss,
among others, how they handle the human behaviour component in terms of
defining attacker profiles.
3.5.1 Externalising Behaviour
Here we introduce an approach to a new, with respect to the literature, modular
model structure. It is to some extent inspired by some of the already existing
formalisms mentioned in Chapter 2, but in addition it aims at providing a more
straightforward and structured way of modelling human behaviour and including
it in the analysis.
A fundamental change to the model structure supported in existing models is
the explicit addition of a component deciding the behaviour of actors. This
change can go along with a further restructuring that also introduces separate
components representing infrastructure, data, and actors, respectively.
An interesting aspect to investigate is the effect ofmixed behaviours, for example,
an attacker minimising the risk of detection until the attack has succeeded or
the attacker has been detected, and then minimising the time needed to leave
the organisation.
In the following subsections we describe the work in more detail. As at the
time of carrying out the research described in this section the model described
in this dissertation was ongoing work in early stage, we applied the approach
to ExASyM. It is important to note that the framework is independent from
the underlying model, and can be added to any of the models discussed in the
related work, as well as to other system models.
3.5.1.1 Modular Structure
The biggest difference compared to the layout of the existing system models
and analysis is exactly this externalisation of behaviour. While in their current
version the different models all deeply integrate the behaviour into the analysis,
and make it hard or impossible to change the behaviour, we extend the model
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Figure 3.3: The modular system model structure. The explicit behaviour com-
ponent and the quantitative data extend the core consisting of
infrastructure, assets, policies, and actors. Each actor has a sepa-
rate behaviour that is queried whenever the analysis or simulation
needs to perform an action. The data associated with the be-
haviour then determines, which action will be performed. The
goal describes, which mode the actor is in, e.g., minimising risk
of detection or time for actions. Both actors and assets are asso-
ciated with locations that describe where they are located in the
model.
with a behaviour component, which determines the actors’ behaviour whenever
queried by the system model.
Figure 3.3 shows the explicit structure of the framework and the interaction
between the components. The behaviour component takes as input the actor,
the actor’s location, the data known, and the state of the system, and returns
which action the actor decides to perform. Each actor has a separate behaviour
that is queried whenever the analysis or simulation needs to perform an action.
The goal describes, which mode the actor is in, e.g., minimising risk of detection
or time for actions.
Models with such an explicit behaviour component ease experiments and analy-
ses of systems with different kind of attackers, simply by replacing the behaviour.
It becomes straightforward, for example, to model actors who are opportunists,
who just want to obtain the item of interest and get out again, or to model
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behaviour driven by resource constraint such as time or risk of detection. Also
the behaviour attributed to insiders, namely that they tend to repeat actions as
long as they are not caught [FH02], and that they become less risk-aware over
time, can easily be modelled.
3.5.1.2 Quantitative Data
The other extension over existing models, and also closely related to the addition
of a behaviour component, is the introduction of quantitative properties for
entities such as actors, actions, and locations. Supporting quantities in the
model opens opportunities for new classes of questions one can ask the model.
Depending on the quantities chosen, it would allow not only to ask whether a
possibility of an attack exists, but also to get estimation about, for example,
the cheapest attack in terms of cost, time, or risk of detection. We believe that
this extension is a step closer to a more realistic approach to system analysis
for vulnerabilities, as it also enables the modeller to use parametrisation of the
model with behaviour of actors.
In a first step we add a set of “straightforward” metrics to the models, including:
• For actions the time to perform this action, the risk of detection when
performing it, and the cost of performing it;
• For actors the likelihood of a social engineering attack to be successful and
the risk appetite of the actor; and
• For locations the risk of detection at this location (for example due to
surveillance cameras).
It is important to note that most of these annotations depend on some kind of
context. The time it takes to perform a certain action certainly depends on the
actor, on the location, on the risk appetite, and many other factors.
As it is out of our scope, we do not consider where this quantitative information
comes from. There are existing studies that analyse insider behaviour, and these
can be used to provide data for the models, as could be sociological analyses
and surveys.
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3.5.1.3 Kinds of Behaviour
The new behaviour component eases experiments with different kinds of be-
haviours, and also with phase shifts between different behaviour within the
same analysis.
Analysing Processes. One of our first approaches to identifying insider
threats in system models was the analysis of a given process describing ac-
tions of an actor in the modelled organisation [PHN07b]. This can be compared
to static analysis of programs; while this approach makes sense in the case of
programs, it is unclear how one would obtain the necessary process representing
a complete trace of actions of an actor performed during an attack.
Representing and analysing this “predetermined” behaviour in the modularly
structured model is straightforward. The behaviour is instantiated with the
process P that one wants to analyse, and every time the model queries for the
next action of the actor, the next action in the process P is returned. In this
scenario, the behaviour does completely ignore the state of the system and the
location of the actor when picking the next action.
The Greedy Explorer. When moving away from processes, the static anal-
ysis approximates all possible actions performed by actors in the system. To
do so, the analysis must assume that every action that can be performed in the
model also will be performed [PH08]. Also this scenario is easily re-implemented
using the external behaviour component. Whenever the model asks the actor
for the next action, the actor gets the location where he is currently located,
obtains all actions permitted at this location by the access control policy, and
iteratively returns the admissible actions.
More Advanced Approaches. The real benefit of the modular behaviour
component becomes apparent when considering new behaviours such as mixed
behaviour with different phases, as discussed above, or history-based behaviour,
which takes previous actions into account. All these could have been introduced
also in the original model, but at the cost of changing the behaviour of all actors.
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1: equivalent()
2: /* perform (log-)equivalent actions */
3: changed = true
4: while changed do
5: changed = false
6: for all actors n do
7: for all locations l that n might be located at do
8: for all locations l′ reachable from l in one step do
9: simulate all actions that n can perform on l′
10: for each action set changed if n at location l learns a new data item
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: end while
Figure 3.4: The greedy explorer algorithm presented in [PH08]. For each ac-
tor in the system we check for all locations he can be located at
whether he can perform any actions, and if yes, perform them.
When switching to the external behaviour component, the only
change necessary is in line 9, where we query the behaviour for
actor n at location l for actions that can be performed at l′.
3.5.1.4 Restructuring a System Model
In our work we have used the structure introduced in the previous section to
obtain a modular system model, in which the behaviour of actors is a parameter
of the model. The model described here has been implemented in [Thy13] as a
restructuring of the original model.
The original algorithm is shown in Figure 3.4 and shows the interweaving of
the behaviour with the analysis. Introducing a separate behaviour component
induces almost no changes in the existing analyses. At the same time it helps
separating the core of the analysis (at which locations do we check for actions
to perform) from the actual decision, which actions will be performed. This is
an immediate result of the modularisation of the system model. Another side
effect is that we can simulate actors with different behaviours.
After adding a behaviour component to the system, the analyses available had
to be adapted accordingly. One of the main goals of the restructuring was to
ease the addition of new analyses, and to provide APIs to support access to the
model’s functionality, including the behaviour. The work in [Thy13] showed that
the adaptation of the existing analyses in the new model was straightforward.
44 System Modelling
1: for all actors n do
2: for all actions a in behaviour(n) do
3: simulate action a
4: for each action set changed if n at location l learns a new data item
5: end for
6: end for
Figure 3.5: The reimplementation of the loop in the pseudo-code in Figure 3.4
(lines 6− 13) using the behaviour component. It should be noted
that all the information regarding, e.g., possible locations of the
actor is stored in its state, so the behaviour does not need addi-
tional input.
3.5.1.5 Lessons Learned
The addition of an external behaviour component to ExASyM, and the reim-
plementation of existing analyses as well as new analyses was surprisingly easy.
The code for existing analyses became much clearer, since the representations
of actors and data contain all their locations, so it is the behaviour component
that decides what to do in case of an actor possibly being located in different lo-
cations, not the analysis. This in itself makes adding the behaviour component
a worthwhile task.
Also for developing new analyses the encapsulation of decisions about possible
actions into the behaviour is beneficial, as the resulting analyses concentrate on
computing the analysis result, and do not have to keep track of where actors
and data might be located.
3.5.2 Modelling Human Behaviour with Higher Order
Logic
In collaboration with members of the computer science group at Middlesex
University, London, UK, we have done some work in the direction of formalising
our approach in Isabelle [NPW02]. In Appendix C we show the Isabelle theory
for a small subset of the model reflecting the running example.
We related the human component in socio-technical systems to a fundamental
model in sociology suggested by one of the forefathers of sociology, Max We-
ber [Web78]. His basic process of sociology, i.e., “understanding explanation”
includes three steps:
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• “interpreting understanding” is the step, where the sociologists try to un-
derstand how the actors interpret their situation,
• the actor’s subjectively meaningful action, and
• the effects of the action itself
An approach following the logic of explanation [HO48], which maps to Weber’s
three steps, is used for explaining sociological phenomena. This approach in-
troduces a view on actors and by doing so Weber’s three steps translate to a
macro-micro-macro-transition. In other words, to explain the global phenom-
ena, the global facts from the macro level are broken down into local views of
the individual actors (representing the micro level), and then the steps from the
micro level are generalised and brought up to the macro level.
Below we briefly discuss how the three transitions are formalised and what is
their relation to security modelling. Then we shortly present how we address
each of the steps using Higher Order Logic (HOL).
Macro to Micro In this step a situational logic maps the global environment
onto the actor’s view.
Usually, formal security models do not model the situational logic. The attacker
skills may be quantified, but neither the motivation nor the social or psycholog-
ical factors are addressed.
The theory supporting this situational logic needs to present the attacker’s
mental characteristics. A framework for characterising insider threats, which
proposes insider threads taxonomy [Nur+14], identify different classes of such
characteristics. Modelling them in HOL is rather easy, simply by using the HOL
datatype.
Micro to Micro The individual actor’s view is represented by a logic of se-
lection, which describes how the actor chooses his actions based on the situation
and his perception. This choice, for example, could be expressed in purely
normative way - the actor’s decision is the result from given rules based on pre-
determined norms.
The attacker’s capabilities and the characterisation of his/her actions is ad-
dressed in several formal security models, for example in protocol verification.
In many security models, the behaviour of the attacker is based on the Dolev-
Yao model. As mentioned earlier, such kind of attacker is the most powerful
kind of attacker.
In the micro level we are interested in modelling the actors within their environ-
ment. The environment is modelled to represent the physical and technical layer
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mentioned in Section 2.1.2. Policies express prerequisites in terms of conditions,
defined by predicates, and a set of enabled actions, granted if the prerequisites
are fulfilled.
Micro to Macro In the third step, the micro-sociological results are lifted
back to the macro level by an aggregation logic. The result then would be the
explanation of the sociological phenomenon.
The aggregation logic is a constant factor in security modelling, as security is
the only sociological aspect we are interested in. The economical aggregation of
attacks though is of utmost interest, i.e., estimation of the direct and implicit
damages of the attacks.
The effect is that of violating a policy, therefore the effect to the macro-level is
subsumed by the negated global policy. For example, the effect of the attack is,
that classified data reaches the outside of the corporate network.
Using the approach described in this section, once a scenario is modelled, a
given attack is then proved as an Isabelle/HOL theorem.
3.6 Modelling the Running Example
In this section we illustrate how the modelling methods described earlier in this
section are applied to the running example presented in Section 3.1. To ease the
reader, we first present a graphical overview of the use case scenario. Using the
model described earlier in this section, the relevant locations, actors, and assets
in the case study become nodes in a graph shown in Figure 3.6:
• Alice, an elderly person, and Charlie, another actor,
• Alice’s home including a door that controls access, a television with a
set-top box, and a remote control,
• Alice’s payment card, which contains the PIN and the name of the card’s
owner, the PIN itself, which is known by Alice, and her password for her
bank account,
• Charlie’s payment card, which similarly contains the PIN and the owner’s
name, as well as the PIN itself, which Charlie knows, and
• an ATM, a bank, and a bank computer, that represents the payment
services.
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Figure 3.6: Graphical representation of the running example. The white rectangles
represent locations, the big grey rectangles represent actors and con-
tain the assets known or owned by the actor, the round nodes represent
assets, and the small squares represent process nodes. Solid lines repre-
sent the physical connections between locations. The dashed rectangles
in the upper right part of some nodes represent the policies assigned to
these nodes.
Access to assets is governed by policies as described above; for example the card
and the PIN are needed to access the money in the ATM, the remote control is
needed to start a process for transferring money from the set-top box, and the
role of an IPTV technician is needed to replace the firmware on the set-top box.
There are two primary actors: Alice, an elderly lady, having a role of a cus-
tomer, i.e., receiving care taking services, and Charlie - a care taker, i.e., having
a role of an employee.
In Figure 3.6, for example, the node representing the actor Alice has a pin code
and a card. The card in turn contains information about the owner and the pin
code for the card.
As described in Section 3.3.1, generic policies may contain variables that are
bound on their first occurrence in the unification, and checked afterwards. In the
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evaluation example shown in Figure 3.6 , the policy for the money in the ATM
is ({card(pin(X)), pin(X)} :{in}). To fullfil this policy, an actor is required to
present a card, which contains a pin code, as well as the pin code matching the
pin code on the card. Doing so, and applying unification (as explained above) to
the concrete credentials {card((pin, 1234)), (pin, 1234)}, results in a successful
unification, where X = 1234, and thereby enables the action in. In the example
this action would represent that the actor is allowed to get money.
The small squares on the left side in Figure 3.6 represent the processes at the
remote control (PRC), the set-top box (PSTB) and the bank computer (PC),
respectively. Their definitions can be seen below:
PU := out ((“pin”, pin)) @RC
PRC := in ((“pin”, !pin)) @RC.
read ((“pin”, pin)) @card.
out ((“pincheck”, “ok”)) @STB
PSTB := in ((“amount”, !amount)) @STB.
in ((“receiver”, !receiver)) @STB.
in ((“pincheck”, “ok”)) @STB.
out ((“transfer”, amount,myAccount,myAccountCredentials, receiver)) @C
PC := in ((“transfer”, !amount, !myAccount, !myAccountCredentials, !receiver)) @C.
read ((“credentials”,myAccountCredentials)) @myAccount.
read ((“balance”, !balance)) @myAccount.
out ((“balance”, balance− amount)) @myAccount.
in (“balance”, !balance) @receiver.
out (“balance”, balance+ amount) @receiver
The user (presented as a simple process PU ) provides his or her pin code at the
remote control. The process running at the remote control PRC inputs the pin
from the remote control. The remote control then outputs the pin at the set-top
box.
The process PSTB initiates a money transfer at the set-top box in Alice’s home.
After inputting the amount and the receiver’s account number, the user’s pin
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is required to be provided at the remote control. After input of the pin, it then
outputs the information at the bank computer.
The process PC at the bank computer inputs the amount to be transferred,
the sender account number, together with the sender’s credentials, as well as
the receiver’s account. After that the process reads the sender’s credentials as
well as his balance. The process then outputs the new balance of the sender
and reads the balance of the receiver. Finally, the process outputs the updated
balance to the receiver’s account.
In the example from Figure 3.6 , the global action-based policy could be
not({X}, {isEmployee(X), card [(owner, Y )], isCustomer(Y )}, {in})
stating that an actor X is not allowed to use a card as credential when perform-
ing an action in, if the predicate isEmployee is true for X and the card is owned
by an actor Y , for whom the predicate isCustomer holds. In the example, the
only possible binding for X is Charlie, and the only possible binding for Y is
Alice, and the action in would represent obtaining money at an ATM.
The underlying formalism of our approach is described in details in the next
Chapter 4.
3.7 Implementation
We implemented our model into a prototype tool written in Scala, that takes as
an input an XML file. The XML schema can be found in Appendix A. The input
is then parsed into the knowledge base, which is used for the further analysis
of the model, e.g., the attack generation described in Section 5.2. Figure 3.7
shows the architecture of the final tool.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have outlined the system model components, we have defined
the policy specification language, and we have also described our attempts to
tackle the problem of modelling human behaviour. Without going into details
of the underlying process calculus, which is described in the following chapter,
we have presented our system model on the running example.
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Figure 3.7: Overview of the tool. The current prototype implements the
parser to read input files, and the attack tree generation. Di-
rect interfaces to analyses, data sources, and a GUI, and probably
also further interfaces, are part of the future work.
With regards to the policy-specification language, it is worth the remark that
our local policies correspond to automated security policies in Sterne’s policy
framework presented in Section 2.1.3. At the same time, our global policies
match both security policy objectives and organisational security policies.
Moreover, the notion of credentials enables the possibility of integration with
other policy-specification languages. Term algebras are very flexible and an
easy to use approach for the syntax of credentials. It is also straightforward
to encode/convert the syntax of the policy-specification languages mentioned
in Section 2.4 into term algebra notation.
At the end, the human factor in the model is reflected in one single way. The
attacker in our model is quite powerful, though not exactly the Dolev-Yao type
of attacker. Despite of the fact, that the attacker knows where and how to
obtain needed credentials, initially they are not necessarily in his possession
as opposed to Dolev-Yao attacker, who knows everything right from the very
beginning.
Initially, as described in Section 3.5, we explored different possibilities to define
the human behaviour as part of the model. With the model evolving within
the big picture of the TRESPASS project, we realised, that it makes the model
unnecessarily too complicated. The analysis of the model is not affected of the
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behaviour itself. Its role starts playing when the attack vectors are generated.
The notion of behaviour is expressed by defining the so called attacker profiles
- a profile defining either an individual or a group with the help of the roles,
which the actors have assigned in the model. A given attack vector might not
be possible given the attacker profile, but it is still a valid attack vector derived
from the analysis of the model. For better clarity, we describe in more details
the major scopes covered in the TRESPASS project in Section 7.1.
The need for quantified data in the model is tightly connected to the behaviour.
Therefore, assigning quantified data on the leaves of the attack trees can then
represent, among others, probability of success, cost or time distribution with
respect to performing the action. In our work, we do not consider where this
quantities come from.
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Chapter 4
The Process Calculus
In the previous chapters, we have presented the system model components,
we have described the policy-specification language and we have demonstrated
how to apply our modelling framework to an IPTV case study. Now, since we
want to generate attack trees analytically from the model, we need to define
an underlying formalisation of our model, which will enable the analysis for the
generation. In this chapter we present the process calculus we use.
Process calculi are a well-established formal modelling technique, well-suited to
describe complex behaviour in terms of relatively simple interacting components.
Last but not least, they lend themselves to develop verification tools like, for
example, the one we present in Chapter 5 for generating attack trees.
We formalise our model using a variation of the Klaim language [NFP98]. We
start with presenting the syntax in Section 4.1. We proceed with a discus-
sion on the reference monitors, used to model the policy-checking mechanism,
in Section 4.2, before moving on to describing the semantics in Section 4.3.
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4.1 Syntax
The syntax of our calculus is shown in Figure 4.1. Since it is very close to
Klaim [NFP98], we first give a very short summary of the main features of Klaim
based on [DGP05] and then point out the main differences that we introduce
here.
In Klaim, nets are collections of nodes N that contain processes P and tuple
spaces TS . A tuple space provides a repository of tuples that can be accessed
concurrently. A node n ∈ N is a pair l :: C, where locality l is the name of
node n and C is the distributed component located at node n. We usually refer
to a node n with its name l. Components C can be processes or tuples. A
tuple t is a sequence of values. Tuples are inactive components that have either
been there already in the initial configuration or have been output by a process
during a computation at this location. The tuple space located at node l results
from the parallel composition of all located tuples positioned at l. Pattern
matching is used to select tuples from a tuple space where the syntax !x is used
to bind variables to values. For example, match(!x, l) produces the substitution
σ = [l/x]. An evaluated tuple et is a tuple which has only values, i.e., it does
not contain any variables. In Klaim, a template matches a tuple if both have
the same number of fields. In our process calculus, both tuples and templates
are of length two. Corresponding fields match, if they have the same name, or
one is a variable and the other one a name.
Processes P can be built from the inert process nil and basic actions for read,
write, move, execute, and creation of new nodes. For example, the action
eval(P )@l sends process P for execution to node l. The action out(t)@l writes a
tuple in the tuple space at node l.The action in(T )@l looks for a matching tuple
et in the tuple space located at l. Templates T help the processes to be able to
choose which tuples to input or read. They represent a format, which acts as a
filter – the tuples should match the template. If et is found, the formal fields of
T are replaced in the continuation process with the corresponding values of et.
We consider in our adaptation of Klaim the actions out, in, read, eval,move
for output, input, read, evaluation of processes, and moving of actors. A process
can be a combination of several sub-processes constructed by parallel composi-
tion or it can be an invocation through a place-holder variable explicitly defined
by an equation.
A location is a tuple space (which can be interpreted as a local database), where
assets are stored. We divide localities into those representing infrastructure of
any kind (li), such as rooms or work stations, and those representing actors (la).
We omit the index when both kinds of localities can be used.
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` ::= li infrastructure location
| la actor location
| u locality variable
P ::= nil null process
| a.P action prefixing
| P1 |P2 parallel composition
| A process invocation
N ::= la ::δ P actor node
| l ::δ TS located tuple
| N1 ‖N2 net composition
a ::= out (t)@` output
| in (T )@` input
| read (T )@` read
| eval (A, δ)@` remote evaluation
| move (`) move
TS ::= ∅ | 〈et〉 | TS, TS tuple space
T ::= (nameexpr, !x) templates
t ::= (nameexpr, valueexpr) tuple
et ::= (string, V ) evaluated tuple
nameexpr ::= string | x name or variable
valueexpr ::= V | x expressions
V ::= string | Int | l values
Figure 4.1: The syntax of our calculus. We divide localities into those rep-
resenting infrastructure of any kind (li), such as rooms or work
stations, and those representing actors (la), or more generally pro-
cesses. We omit the index when both kinds of localities can be
used. Tuple spaces contain evaluated tuples. In contrast to Klaim
we limit tuples (and templates) to pairs; the first component speci-
fies the name, the second component is either a string (to represent
knowledge) or a location (to represent items). Locations have a
name (the l) and an access policy δ.
An asset can represent either data or items. Data in our calculus is also restricted
compared to original Klaim. As we mentioned earlier, we only allow tuples and
templates of length two – the first element is the name of the tuple and the
second element contains its value, which can be a string or a location.
Data is stored as a pair – the first element is its name (string) and the second
element is the value itself (string or an integer). Data represents information,
which is “known” by an actor, for example, the pin code in Figure 3.6 known
by Alice. Items are represented by a pair of a value and a location, for example
a payment card, which in turn can contain further assets in their tuple space.
An example for the latter is the information about the owner and the pin code
contained in the chip of a payment card.
Locations in our calculus are divided into infrastructure locations li and actor
locations la. As stated above, processes can only be executed at actor locations,
and while in Klaim processes move around in the system, in our approach the
node hosting the process moves around. We have chosen this approach mostly
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to unify the interaction of the system with items carried by an actor and with
items stored at a location. To integrate actors as moving nodes, we stipulate as
a well-formedness condition that they are always defined as singleton nodes, i.e.,
∀ l ∈ Na. |{(l, x)|(l, x) ∈ E}| = 1. If this condition is initially true, it is preserved
by the semantics of the actions, in particular, move.
An alternative to this approach would have been to store locations representing
items in a key set at the process, similar to [PHN07b], but then the actions in
and out would have required different semantics, depending on whether the
goal location of the action is a location in the system (where the data would be
stored in the tuple space) or an actor (where the data would be stored in the
key set).
The other difference between our approach and Klaim is that locations have an
access control policy δ attached, e.g., l ::δ P , similarly to [De +10]. The policies
δ regulate access to the location. While in general a policy could contain several
pairs of required credentials and enabled actions, we assume for sake of simplicity
that policies only contain one such pair.
4.2 Reference Monitors
Reference monitors are an approach to check the enforcement of a given security
policy on a system. In other words, it is the reference monitors, which make au-
thorisation decisions with regards to policies [D1.2.2], which have been discussed
in Section 3.3. For the semantics we first introduce a reference monitor similar
to [PHN07b], which can be seen in Figure 4.2. The function grants checks in
the infrastructure I (defined below) whether an actor l is allowed to perform an
action a at target location t. Computing grants checks the infrastructure to see
whether l is located either at t or at a location next to t, and whether the actor
is allowed to perform the action by the policy at t based on its location, its id,
or its knowledge.
Actor actor is allowed to perform action a at target location t if actor is located
at t or at a neighbouring node, and if the access control policy at t can be
discharged by actor. This check is performed by function enables using unifica-
tion of actor knowledge and required credentials. This reference monitor is used
in all semantic rules, described in the following section, to decide whether the
conclusion of the rule is fired or not. If the grants function returns false, the
semantic rule blocks.
Both functions, grants and enables, are parametrized on the infrastructure I,
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grantsI : Na × N× Policies× Actions→ {true, false}
grantsI(actor, t, δt, a) =

true if I = (Ni,Na,E) and ∃l′ ∈ Ni :
((actor, l′) ∈ E ∧ (l′, t) ∈ E) ∨ l′ = t)∧
enablesI(actor, a, δt)
false otherwise
enablesI : Na × Actions× Policies→ {true, false}
enablesI(actor , a, δ) =

true if δ = ∅
true if δ = (cred , act) ∧ unifyI(actor , cred) ∧ a ∈ act
false otherwise
Figure 4.2: Function grants checks whether an actor node l is allowed to per-
form action a at location t. This is allowed if l is located at t or at
a neighbouring node, and if the access control policy at t can be
discharged by l. This check is performed by function enables us-
ing unification of actor knowledge and required credentials. Both
functions are parametrized with the infrastructure I, which defines
the structure of the model.
which defines the structure of the model. The infrastructure I = (Ni,Na,E)
consists of sets of nodes representing the physical locations (Ni), actor and
process locations (Na), and a set of edges (E ⊆ N × Ni), where we define N =
Ni ∪Na . This represents that actors can be located at infrastructure locations,
and there are edges connecting the infrastructure locations. An edge (actor, l) ∈
E describes that actor actor is located at location l.
4.3 Semantics
In this section we present the semantics of our process calculus. After briefly
discussing what the differences from the existing approaches are, we explain
each of the rules presented in Figure 4.3.
The semantics of our calculus is based on that of ExASyM [PH08]. Similar to
ExASyM, the semantics is based on an infrastructure representing the underly-
ing infrastructure I. The processes performing actions on I are constrained by
the policies δ on locations, which are enforced by reference monitors (boxes in
the rules) similar to [PHN07b]. The grants function takes as an input an actor,
a location, a policy at that location, and an action and ensures that the actor is
allowed to perform the action at the certain location. In case there is a policy
assigned to the location from the input, a check ensures that the actor fulfils
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[[t]] = et grantsI(l, l
′, δ′,o)
I ` l ::δ out (t)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ TS −→ I ` l ::δ P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈et〉, TS
match([[T ]], et) = σ grantsI(l, l
′, δ′, i)
I ` l ::δ in (T )@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈et〉, TS −→ I ` l ::δ Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ TS
match([[T ]], et) = σ grantsI(l, l
′, δ′, r)
I ` l ::δ read (T )@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈et〉, TS −→ I ` l ::δ Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈et〉, TS
I′ = (Ni,Na,E \ {(l, x)|(l, x) ∈ E} ∪ {(l, l′)}) grantsI(l, l′, δ′,m)
I ` l ::δ move (l′) .P −→ I′ ` l ::δ P I = (Ni,Na,E)
I′ = (Ni,Na ∪ {lQ},E ∪ {(lQ, l′)}) grantsI(l, l′, δ′, e)
I ` l ::δ eval (Q, δQ)@l′.P −→ I′ ` l ::δ P ‖ lQ ::δQ Q I = (Ni,Na,E), lQ 6∈ Na
I ` N1 −→I I′ ` N ′1
I ` N1 ‖N2 −→I I′ ` N ′1 ‖N2
N ≡ N1 I ` N1 −→I I′ ` N2 N2 ≡ N ′
I ` N −→I I′ ` N ′
Figure 4.3: The semantics for the actions of our calculus. We assume that
all locations exist in the infrastructure so we omit sanity checks.
The action out outputs a tuple at the target location, the action
in consumes a tuple, while the action read is non-destructive. In
contrast to Klaim, a locality containing a process moves around
together with the process. The action move reconnects the loca-
tion of the process executing the action to the goal location, and
the action eval creates a new location with the new process and
connects it to the goal location.
the credentials in the policy and the action from the input is among the enabled
actions act in the policy. The enabled actions are a subset of Actions, where
Actions = {i,o, r,m, e}
represent the simple actions from our syntax, where i stands for input, o stands
for output, r stands for read, m stands for move, and e stands for eval.
The function then returns a Boolean value – true represents that the actor is
allowed to perform the action at the specified location. Respectively, false
means the opposite, i.e., that the action can not be performed. The formal def-
inition of the grants function used in the reference monitors has been described
in Section 4.2 (see also Figure 4.2).
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match(V, V ) =  match(!x, V ) = [V/x]
match(T1, et1) = σ1 match(T2, et2) = σ2
match((T1, T2), (et1, et2)) = σ1 ◦ σ2
Figure 4.4: Semantics for template matching.
The main difference to both ExASyM and Klaim is that the rules for move
and eval take the infrastructure and actor nodes into account.
In the rules describing the basic actions in Figure 4.3, which are explained in
detail below, [[t]] denotes the evaluation of a tuple, and [[T ]] denotes the evaluation
of a template. We also assume, that all locations in the infrastructure exist,
therefore we omit sanity checks.
The action out places an evaluated tuple et in the tuple space of location l. It
is worth noting, that the action out is asynchronous and always succeeds, as it
operates on tuple spaces and those are said to be “always available for writing”.
The action in attempts to input a tuple from the tuple space of node l. It takes
a template T and tries to match it against all tuples at node l. The formalisation
of the pattern matching can be seen in Figure 4.4. Whenever a matching tuple
is found, it is removed from the tuple space of the node l. If no matching tuple
is found, the action blocks. The execution of the rest of the process (if any)
then continues, where the substitution σ, resulting from the template matching,
is applied.
The action read is very similar to the action in with the only difference, that
the evaluated tuple et is not removed from the tuple space. It is obvious that
if a process can perform the action in, it will also succeed in performing the
action read.
The rule for the action move removes any edges from the actor node `a to the
infrastructure node `i, and adds a new edge to the goal of the action move. In
other words, we simulate movement by changing the connectivity of the nodes.
The action eval takes a process Q and policies σQ as arguments, creates a new
location `Q, and connects it to the action’s target location `′. Both actionsmove
and eval result in a new infrastructure I ′.
Figure 4.4 shows the semantics for the template matching. In the first rule, if
we match a value against itself, we produce the empty substitution, i.e., the
identity. The second rule matches a value against the defining occurrence of a
variable and produces a substitution that binds the variable to the value. In the
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N1 ‖N2 ≡ N2 ‖N1
(N1 ‖N2 ) ‖N3 ≡ N1 ‖(N2 ‖N3 )
l ::δ P ≡ l ::δ (P |nil)
l ::δ TS ≡ l ::δ (TS | ∅)
l ::δ A ≡ l ::δ P if A 4= P
l ::δ (P1 |P2 ) ≡ l ::δ P1 ‖ l ::δ P2
Figure 4.5: Structural congruence on nets and processes.
third rule, provided that we have a substitution σ1, resulting from matching the
template T1 and an evaluated tuple et1, and we have another substitution σ2,
resulting from matching the template T2 against an evaluated tuple et2, then
matching (T1, T2) against the pair (et1, et2) produces the composition of the
two substitutions.
The structural congruence, denoted by the symbol ≡, defines when two pro-
cesses are congruent to each other (P1 ≡ P2). Figure 4.5 shows the rules for the
structural congruence. The relation enforces that processes constitute a com-
mutative monoid with respect to parallel composition and nil. We assume the
symbol ≡ to be a congruence over networks (and processes, respectively), i.e., it
has the reflexivity, transitivity and symmetry properties, as in standard Klaim.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have seen the process calculus we use for our system model.
We have presented its syntax, operational semantics, and the reference monitors
used for checking the policies.
There is some tension between the need for a graphical notation for to be un-
derstandable to professionals and business users (on the one hand). On the
other hand, we have the need of a formal language-based representation to en-
able the development of automated analysis techniques. It is of course highly
desirable to establish a formal correspondence between the graphical model and
the language-based model.
In the context of this dissertation, we limit to show examples in the graphical
notation, that can be naturally translated into the process calculus presented in
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this chapter. In the wider context of the TRESPASS project, an entire strand
of research aims at producing tools for supporting graphical modelling, that
enforce those constraints that make the graphical notation encodable into the
language-based notation.
We do not expect the practitioners to fiddle with the process calculus. On the
contrary, we would like to close the gap between the theoretical approach and
the application-oriented users.
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Chapter 5
Attack Generation
The manual identification of possible attacks on organisations is a creative pro-
cess. However, it could be not only tedious, but also highly error prone. More-
over, in the case of complex enterprises, it is nearly impossible to adequately
reflect changes in the structure of the organisation with respect to its risk as-
sessment.
Since the interest of closing this gap, both within industry and academia, has
been increasing significantly the last few years, there have recently been studies
proposing automatic attack tree generation methods. However, none of them
have addressed the deficiency in the classical risk assessment methodologies,
namely the lack of social and human aspects in the attack steps. Using recent
advances in system models, we have developed a technique to identify possible
attacks analytically, including technical and human factors.
In this chapter we first present in Section 5.1 the attack generation technique
based on graphical transformations, while sparing the reader any technical de-
tails concerned with the formalism of our system model. After that, in Sec-
tion 5.2, we suggest the use of system models to systematically generate attack
trees by invalidating policies.
The generated attack trees can then be used as an input to a traditional risk
assessment process and thereby extend and support the brainstorming results.
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We would like to note, that in both approaches we assume an implicit left to
right order of the sub-goals in the attack trees.
5.1 High Level Graphical Transformation of Sys-
tem Models
In this section we present the graphical transformations of our attack generation
technique. Since the transformations consider all relevant system components,
the resulting attacks may include elements of human behaviour.
5.1.1 Transforming Models without Asset Mobility
In this section we consider assets in the modelled organisation to be immobile.
This restriction, which will be lifted in the next section, simplifies the first
presentation of transformations.
The transformation starts from the specification of an asset, which an attacker
should not be able to obtain. The goal of the transformation is to generate
an attack for every possible actor in the system after which that actor would
have obtained the asset in question. The overall transformation is a generalised
version of policy invalidation [KW13; KW14]:
1. Starting from the goal asset and the attacking actor,
2. the transformation identifies all paths to the asset,
3. and for every path, identifies the credentials that the actor is lacking;
4. for each missing credential, a new transformation is started recursively;
5. after obtaining all necessary credentials, the actor can reach the location
of the goal asset, and perform an action to obtain it.
In the following subsections, we present for each of the model elements discussed
in Section 3.2, how they are transformed into an attack representation. For each
transformation we show the part of the system model that triggers the transla-
tion as well as the generated part of the attack model. For the system models
we use the same graphical representation as shown in Section 3.6 and Figure 3.6.
For attack models we use a special notation that represents parts of the attack
as circles, and invocations of the transformation as rectangles.
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l1
loc attacker
l
ln. . .
p1 pn
pass pn
goto l
goto l
pass p1
goto l1 goto l goto ln
. . .
Figure 5.1: Reaching a location. For every path from an initial location loc to
a target location l, we generate an attack that takes the first step
and then continues to l.
5.1.1.1 Locations
A location is transformed into a disjunction of all possible paths from the lo-
cations already reached by the attacker to the location in question. Whenever
traversing a path requires new credentials due to some policy, we recursively
invoke the attack transformation, which ensures that the attacker obtains the
necessary credentials to pass the path.
The transformation pattern is shown in Figure 5.1. For every possible path
we first generate one step to the first node of the path, followed by a recursive
invocation of the transformation for going to the target location.
loc
{c1 … cn}: a
get credentials  
& perform a
get 
credentials  
perform a 
at loc
get c1 get cn. . .
Figure 5.2: Transforming a policy. If the attacker lacks any credential to per-
form action a at the location loc, the transformation creates an
attack that obtains that credential.
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5.1.1.2 Policies
If the transformation at any point needs to create an action that is prohibited
by a policy, for which the attacker lacks a credential, a new transformation is
started to obtain this credential, resulting in a new attack representation. The
transformation pattern is shown in Figure 5.2.
As mentioned above, many system models support predicates as credentials,
for example, to express that the actor must possess a certain attribute. In the
example shown in Figure 3.6, an actor must be trusted by Alice in order to be
allowed to move to the location Door. Often, such a predicate is not a credential
that can be obtained, as for trust. In this case, the transformation generates a
social engineering action to “obtain” the predicate in question.
The variables in policies can be factored out before performing this transforma-
tion by identifying all sets of assets that fulfil a policy. For the example shown
in Figure 3.6 and the location ATM, the possible sets of assets are the card and
the pin at Alice or at Charlie.
We assume that the transformation generates all necessary steps for obtaining
the necessary assets before performing the action. In the resulting attack repre-
sentation, the root node of the attack representation for obtaining the necessary
credentials will be to the left of the root node for performing the following
actions, expressing an ordering as described above.
5.1.1.3 Data
Data represents intangible assets, such as passwords or pins. For obtaining
data, a conjunction is generated where the first goal for the attacker is to reach
the location of the data. There, an action in the attack representation will be
generated that depends on where the data is contained:
• If the data is contained in a location, then an input will be generated; or
• If the data is contained at an actor, then a social engineering action will
be generated.
If the goal data is contained in an item i , the transformation generates the
conjunction of several actions:
• Obtain the item and then obtain the data from the item; or
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l1 X ln X. . .
get X
get X at lnget X at l1 . . .
Figure 5.3: Items and data may be available from different locations. For each
of these locations, the transformation generates a separate attack
path to obtain the asset. The transformation will generate attacks
to obtain all necessary credentials, and then input the asset.
loc X
{credentials}: a
get X at loc
goto loc get credentials  & input X at loc
Figure 5.4: To obtain an asset from a location, the transformation generates
the necessary attack to go to the asset’s location, then obtains any
required credentials, and finally inputs the asset.
• Obtain the data from the item directly.
The difference between the two options is that the first option represents the
case that the attacker obtains the containing item itself and then obtains the
data, while the second option represents the case that the attacker removes the
data or item in place.
For the example of the workstation mentioned at the end of Section 3.2 this
would mean that the attacker either steals the hard drive containing the file, or
that he extracts the file from the hard drive.
5.1.1.4 Items
Items represent tangible assets, such as the aforementioned workstation, hard-
disk, or an access card. Just as for data, we generate a conjunction that first
contains a node that represents the attacker reaching the location of an item.
Then, an action in the attack representation will be generated that depends on
the kind of location that contains the item:
• If the item is contained in a location, then an input will be generated;
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loc X
{credentials}: a
input X at loc
in X at loc
Figure 5.5: To obtain an asset that is directly contained at a location, the
transformation simply generates an input. Note that the necessary
credentials have been obtained before invoking this transformation
(Figure 5.4).
loc
{credentials}: a
item X
input X at loc
in item at loc
get credentials  
& 
input X at item
input X at loc
get credentials  
&
input X at item
Figure 5.6: To obtain an asset that is transitively contained at a location, the
transformation first obtains the item containing the asset and then
recursively invokes the transformation.
actorX
input X 
at actor
in X at loc SE actor in X
Figure 5.7: Obtaining an asset from an actor is almost the same as for loca-
tions; the only difference is that assets can be obtained by social
engineering. The transformation generates a special social engi-
neering action, which is not further defined. Refining this action
depends on the context of the action such as, e.g., the involved
actors; this is left to later phases that consume the generated at-
tack.
• If the item is contained at an actor, then a disjunction of a social engineer-
ing action or an in action will be generated, where the latter represents
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an attempt of stealing the item.
If the goal item is contained in another item, the transformation generates the
conjunction of several actions:
• Obtain the item and then obtain the goal item from the item; or
• Obtain the goal item from the item directly.
The difference between the two options in the generated disjunctions is that the
first option represents the case that the attacker obtains the containing item
itself, while the second option represents the case that the attacker removes the
data or item in place.
For the example of the workstation mentioned before this would mean that
the attacker either steals the workstation containing the hard-drive, or that he
extracts the hard-drive from the workstation.
5.1.1.5 Triggering the Transformation
In general the transformation will be triggered by a certain asset being off-
limits for an attacker. The transformation iterates over a specified set of actors
available in the system model, and generates for each of these actors all possible
attacks for how they can obtain the asset. The triggering transformation for an
asset X is get X . While transforming the system model into an attack model,
the transformation keeps track of the attacker, the location reached, and the
assets obtained. The attacker may already possess assets before starting the
transformation; this is specified in the system model.
5.1.2 Adding Data Mobility
So far we have assumed assets to be at static locations. This assumption sim-
plifies both the transformations for attack generation and the structure of the
generated attacks; instead of having to consider all the locations that an asset
can reach by means of actors or processes, we only have to consider the loca-
tions where data is available in the model. We now discuss how to loosen this
restriction.
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In Subsection 5.1.1.3 and Subsection 5.1.1.4 the transformations described as-
sume that the data is available from a number of locations in the model, either
directly or transitively. The main transformation starting the generation of sub-
attacks is shown in Figure 5.3. When adding data mobility, we are interested in
which other locations the assets are able to reach, either by means of processes
(for virtual assets) or by means of actors (for real-world assets).
The transformation for data mobility works in reverse compared to the transfor-
mations we have presented in the previous section. Before being able to generate
an attack, we need to perform three steps:
1. Identify who is able to move the asset;
2. Identify how to trigger the movement; and
3. Identify which locations the asset can reach.
The result of these steps is an attack that triggers the movement, and a set of
locations that the asset can reach; these locations can then be used as input to
the transformation shown in Figure 5.3.
The main task lies in identifying who can trigger the movement and how. Be-
yond these steps, adding data mobility does not add to the transformation, but
to the complexity of the generated attack model.
5.2 Policy Invalidation
After presenting the overview of the graphical transformation in the previous
section, in this section we present the formalism behind the generation of attack
trees by invalidating policies. Attack trees are chosen as a succinct way of
representing attacks; they are defined by
Definition 5.1 (Attack trees and operations.) An attack tree is a tree
AT := (Ni ∪˙ Nl, n, E, L), containing inner nodes Ni := N∧ ∪˙ N∨ and leaf
nodes Nl, a root node n ∈ Ni, directed edges E ⊆ Ni×Ni ∪˙Nl, and a labelling
function L := N → Σ?. A node in an attack tree is a conjunction (N∧) or
disjunction (N∨) of sub-attacks, or a basic action in an attack (Nl). Let N label
be the attack tree that only contains one node n that is mapped by L to label.
For AT 1 = (N1, n1, E1, L1) and AT 2 = (N2, n2, E2, L2), kind ∈ {∨,∧}, label
being a string, and n ∈ Nkind , we define the addition of attack trees as
AT 1⊕labelkindAT 2 := (N1∪N2∪{n}, E1∪E2∪{(n, n1), (n, n2)}, n, L1∪L2∪{(n, label})
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Note that we assume an implicit, left to right order for the children of conjunctive
nodes. For example, an attacker first needs to move to a location before being
able to perform an action.
Policy invalidation operates on global, organisational policies. Like local poli-
cies, a global policy consists of required credentials and enabled actions. On a
high level, our approach for invalidating a policy consists of four basic steps:
1. Choose the policy to invalidate, and identify the possible actors who could
do so; these are the potential attackers.
2. Identify a set of locations where the prohibited actions can be performed.
Since there might be several possible actions, this results in a set of pairs
of location and action.
3. Recursively generate attacks for performing these actions. This will also
identify required assets to perform any of these actions, and obtain them.
4. Finally, move to the location identified in the second step and perform the
action.
It should be noted that all rules specified below either block if no valid result
can be computed, or return an empty attack tree, for example, if no credentials
are required. The rules take as input an infrastructure component I, which has
been defined in Section 4.2, and an actor component A, which stores identities,
locations, and assets collected and reached by an actor during an attack. Also
note that we extend rules from working on singular elements to sets by unifying
the results of rule applications.
5.2.1 Identify Attackers
The overall rule for starting the attack generation from a global policy is shown
in Figure 5.8. After having computed the unification of the global policy and the
set of all actors, we identify the set of attackers by means of function getAttacker ,
which replaces a variable with the identified bindings, or returns an explicitly
specified attacker:
getAttackerI(a, σ) :=
{
{a} if a ∈ Na
σ(a) if a ∈ Vars
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σ = unifyI(Actors, credentials)
attackers = getAttackerI(actor , σ) goals = applicableAtI(credentials, enabled, σ)
I, attackers, goals `goal trees T := ⊕“perform any actions”∨ trees
I,not(actor , credentials, enabled) `P T
Figure 5.8: Attack generation starts from the global action-based policy
not(actor , credentials, enabled). Attack trees are generated for all
possible policy violations. As every attack tree represents a vio-
lation of the policy, the resulting attack trees are combined by an
or node.
I,A, goto(location) ∧ perform(action) `GP T
I,A, (location, action) `goal T
I,A, goto(l) `goto Tgoto ,A′ I,A′, perform(a) `perform Taction ,A′′
I,A, goto(l) ∧ perform(a) `GP Tgoto ⊕“goto l and perform a”∧ Taction ,A′′
Figure 5.9: For each identified goal (consisting of a location and an action) an
attacker moves to the location and performs the action. The rules
result in an attack tree and a new state of the attacker, which
includes the obtained keys and reached locations.
5.2.2 Identify Target Locations
Assuming there is an attacker, we then compute all locations at which one of
the actions in enabled could be applied using the credentials specified in the
policy. The function applicableAt identifies all locations in the system model at
which one of the actions is applicable and returns goals as pairs of actions and
locations.
5.2.3 Attack Generation
Using the information about all possible attackers and the locations at which the
actions are applicable, we proceed to the actual generation of attack trees. The
rules in Figure 5.9 connect the identified goals with the generation of attack
trees. For each goal, two attack trees are generated: one for moving to the
location and one for performing the action. While moving to the location, new
credentials may be required; as a result, the actor acquires new knowledge, which
is stored in the actor component A, which contains the obtained identities and
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paths = getAllPathsI(A, l) I,A, paths `path trees,A′
T := ⊕“find path to l”∨ trees
I,A, goto(l) `goto T ,A′
missing = missingCredentialsI(A, path) I,A,missing `credential trees,A′
T := ⊕“get credentials”∧ trees
I,A, path `path T ⊕“get credentials and pass path”∧ Npass path,A′
Figure 5.10: Going to a location and performing an action is broken down into
two attack trees. The function getAllPaths returns all paths from
the current locations of the actor to the goal location l, and the
resulting attack trees are combined as alternatives for reaching
this location. The resulting actor has obtained the necessary
credentials and reached the location l.
credentials, and reached locations.
The rules in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 simulate actions of attackers in the
modelled organisation: moving around, performing actions, and obtaining cre-
dentials. In doing so, attack trees are created for every single action of the
attacker, and the resulting trees are combined in the overall attack tree.
The function missingCredentials uses the unification described above to match
policies with the assets available in the model. This implies that all assets that
can fulfil a policy are identified; the attack generation then generates one attack
for each of these assets, and combines them with a disjunctive node.
Another global location-based policy could forbid employees to obtain money
that has been “owned” by a customer. In this case, the processes defined in Sec-
tion 3.6 for the set-top box and the bank computer would become important,
as they allow to transfer money from Alice’s to Charlie’s account. When invali-
dating this global policy, the analysis computes the flow of assets both through
the world and the network layer.
5.2.4 Post-Processing Attack Trees
The generated attack trees also often contain duplicated sub-trees, due to sim-
ilar scenarios being encountered in several locations, for example, the social
engineering of the same actor, or the requirement for the same credentials. This
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i 6∈ identities =⇒ T = Nobtain identity i
I, (identities, locations, assets), identity i `credential T , (identities ∪ {i}, locations, assets)
A = (identities, locations, assets) ∧ a 6∈ assets =⇒
goals = availableAtI(a) I,A, goals `goal trees,A′ T := ⊕“get a”∨ trees
I,A, asset a `credential T ,A′
I,A, predicate p(arguments) `predicate trees,A′ T := ⊕“fulfil predicate p”∨ trees
I,A, predicate p(arguments) `credential T ,A′
Figure 5.11: Depending on the missing credential, different attacks are gener-
ated. If the actor lacks an identity, an attack node representing
an abstract social engineering attack is generated, for example,
social engineering or impersonating. If the missing credential is
an asset, the function availableAt returns a set of pairs of loca-
tions from which this asset is available, and the according in ac-
tions. If the missing credential is a predicate, a combination of
credentials fulfilling the predicate must be obtained.
is not an inherent limitation, but often makes the attack trees unnecessarily
big and cluttered. Similar to [VNN14], a post-processing of attack trees can
simplify the result.
5.3 Analysing the Running Example
In this section we demonstrate the mechanism of the attack generation by relat-
ing it to the running example. The attack tree shown in Figure 5.12 is generated
from the example scenario.
As mentioned in the previous section, we define as the global policy in our
running example that an employee is not allowed to use a customer’s card to
obtain money:
not({X}, {isEmployee(X), card [(owner, Y )], isCustomer(Y )}, {in})
Using the rule from Figure 5.8, we compute a substitution for the variables X
and Y to be
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σ = [X 7→ Charlie, Y 7→ Alice]
The substitution σ maps X to Charlie because he has the role employee, and
Y to Alice as she has the role customer. In the next step, the attacker is
identified to be the mapping of X in σ, namely Charlie, and then we identify
the possible locations where the global policy can be violated. Based on the
system specification from Figure 3.6, the only location with a policy restricting
the in action is the money location at the ATM A1. There is therefore only
one possible location and action pair, namely {(A1, in)}, and the next step is
to invoke `P from Figure 5.10 to generate the attack tree for moving to A1 and
performing the in action.
Going to the location does not require additional credentials, but performing the
in action does. The missingCredentials function returns the card and the pin,
which combined with the requirement from the goal policy, that the owner of
the card must be Alice, implies that the needed credentials are Alice’s card and
her pin. For each of these credentials the second rule `credential in Figure 5.11
identifies where they are: Alice has the card and the pin, and the pin code is
also stored in the card.
As a result, our approach generates an attack tree for going to the location
“home”, and in doing so the attacker must fulfil the policy “trustedBy(Alice)”,
meaning that he must impersonate somebody trusted by Alice. Then the at-
tacker can either “input” the card and the pin, or only the card and then try to
extract the pin code from the card.
The stealing and the extraction of the pin code are not represented in the model
since they are context and technology dependent. In a given scenario, they can
be instantiated with the matching “real” actions. After the assets have been
obtained, the attacker moves to the ATM location and performs the action.
For the first possible attack, Charlie would use his own card and pin; this does
not require further credentials. For the second possible attack, Charlie needs
to obtain the pin and the card from Alice. Alice’s location is Home, and to
pass the path to this location, Charlie must fulfil the predicate trustedby(Alice).
This results in an action social engineer Alice move Door, which could in a later
phase, for example, be translated into a forceful entrance or pretending to be
somebody who Alice trusts or is likely to let in her home. Once the location
Home has been reached, Charlie has several options for obtaining the card and
the pin:
• Social Engineer Alice to give him the card and the pin;
76 Attack Generation
• Input card from Alice (stealing); and
• Input the pin from the card (skimming).
The generated attack represents all combinations hereof; some parts of the tree
can be pruned or simplified in a later phase similar to [VNN14]. Once the card
and the pin have been obtained, Charlie moves to the location ATM and inputs
the asset cash.
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perform all actions
goto A1 and perform in $$$
goto A1 perform in
get card pin and perform in
goto home and perform in card
goto home
goto door impersonate somebody Alice trusts goto home
get card
get card from Alice
goto home and perform in pin
goto home
goto door impersonate somebody Alice trusts goto home
get pin
get pin from card get pin from Alice
perform in $$$
hire more skilled attacker
Figure 5.12: Attack tree generated by the prototype implementation for the example shown in Figure 3.6.
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The resulting attack tree is shown in Figure 5.12. Not surprisingly, the trans-
formation result contains identical sub-trees due to identical assets to obtain or
identical patterns being transformed. Similar to the actions for obtaining items,
these could be simplified by a follow-up pass.
5.4 Implementation
The implemented tool takes as an input a scenario describing a system model
of an organisation and a policy to invalidate. The policy, as described in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, can be either location-based or action-based.
The input has an XML format. The XML structure along with a description of
the different elements and attributes can be found in Appendix A. The tool has
been implemented in Scala, but has not been released publicly yet. It generates
an attack tree, based on the input, and represents it textually in XML format.
The ADtool [KS12a; KS12b] is then used to turn the XML into a graphical
representation of the generated attack tree.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have shown an approach to attack tree generation including
human factors from a system model. While the notion of “human factor” could
be stronger, our approaches are flexible enough to support all kinds of human
factors that can be instantiated once an attack has been identified.
In the work described in this chapter, we only consider the pure transformation
of system models to attack trees. An essential next step in risk assessment is to
evaluate the risk and impact of the different attack vectors, for example, by an-
notating the attack tree with metrics and performing analyses on them [AN15].
This mapping can be achieved by associating the elements’ identifiers with rel-
evant metrics. These metrics can represent any quantitative knowledge about
components, for example, likelihood, time, price, impact, or probability distri-
butions. The latter could describe behaviour of actors or timing distributions.
For the transformation described in this chapter these metrics are irrelevant,
but they can be evaluated on the generated attack trees.
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5.5.1 Complexity, Soundness and Completeness
Important issues in the model as well as in the attack generation are complexity
as well as soundness and completeness of the attack generation with respect to
the model. All the three properties are directly related to the usability of the
framework. Soundness and completeness ensure that the results are reliable,
and complexity impacts scalability of the approach; scalability implies that the
results can be computed also for real-world scenarios.
In the attack generation described in Section 5.2.3 we assume that an attacker
has a set of keys and a set of identities. Throughout the generation process, the
attack generation keeps track of the locations reached by an attacker. Using
these properties, attackers can obtain new identities, new keys, and reach new
locations, and doing so will give them the possibility of acquiring even more
knowledge or access. Since the attack generation is a white-box analysis, where
all the knowledge about the analysed model is available through an oracle, the
overall complexity of attack generation is in theory cubic in the size of the
model; in practice, the number of identities and keys can be expected to be
much smaller than the size of the model, reducing the complexity significantly.
The attack generation is sound with respect to the model, that is all generated
attack trees establish a sequence of actions that will lead to a validation of a goal
in the modelled organisation. Like counter-example traces in model checking,
this means that the result of the attack generation shows one or several ways in
which the goal policy can be broken; several ways are represented as alternatives
in the generated attack tree.
The attack generation is also complete with respect to the model, that is all
attacks that are possible in the model will be found. The attack generation
starts from the goal policy, which states what is considered as an attack on
the modelled organisation; the generation then identifies all possible actions
of breaking the goal policy. For each of these actions, all possible attacks are
identified for performing them, and so on, until the necessary assets are acquired.
The important point in this discussion is “with respect to the model”. Only
attacks in the model can be identified, and if a necessary asset, action, or location
is not contained in the model, it cannot and will not be considered in any
generated attack.
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5.5.2 Precision
The combination of system model and automated generation enables us to trade
in precision of the model for details in the attack trees. For example, the mod-
elling of the ATM is very imprecise in the example from Figure 3.3. In that
example the ATM has a policy that allows inputting the money, once the cor-
rect pin is provided. Therefore, attacks derived from this way of modelling of
the ATM would need a card and the corresponding pin. The connection between
the user and the obtained money is direct. Other attacks, for example shoulder
surfing, would not be generated by analysing the model.
A more detailed description would be:
PU := out ((“card & pin”, card, pin, user)) @ATM.
in ((“card”, card)) @U.
in ((“amount”, amount)) @U
PATM := in ((“card & pin”, !card, !pin, !user)) @ATM.
read ((“pin”, pin)) @card.
in ((“amount”, !amount)) @ATM.
out ((“card”, card)) @U.
out ((“amount”, amount)) @U
This process definition represents that an actor puts the card and the pin code
into the ATM and receives back money after a check with the bank. In this
model, the attack tree generator is able to find out that one can obtain the pin
code from the ATM, since it is input into the system.
A third, even more precise, approach would be having a connection from the
user, through the keyboard, to the ATM, and respectively, connection between
the user and the ATM when the money is output:
A process at the card reader (PCR) can be defined as follows:
PCR := in ((“card”, !card)) @CR.
read ((“pin”, !pin)) @card.
out ((“pin”, pin)) @CR
Accordingly, the process running at the ATM machine (PKB ) would look like
this:
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PATM := in ((“pin”, !pin)) @KB.
in ((“pin”, pin)) @CR.
in ((“amount”, !amount)) @KB.
out ((“amount”, amount)) @Money.
out ((“card”, card)) @CR
PU := out ((“pin”, pin)) @KB.
in ((“amount”, amount)) @KB.
in ((“amount”, !amount)) @Money
Yet another level of precision would be to define a process on the payment card
that checks the pin code. However, the more sophisticated the model is, the
more complex the attack generation and respectively the size of the attack tree
would be. In order to not excessively complicate the further attack tree analyses,
it is important for the modeller to model the right level of details, depending of
the nature of the attacks that need to be identified.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
In this chapter we illustrate how our approach is applied to risk assessment of
cloud infrastructures. While the assessment is similar to the one shown before for
the IPTV case study, the system is more complex. A typical cloud infrastructure
potentially contains thousands of nodes which are highly interconnected and
dynamic.
After presenting risk assessment for a simplified scenario from the cloud case
study, we conclude the chapter with a discussion of our approach considering
the related work presented in Chapter 2.
6.1 Cloud Computing
We start with an overview of the different components in a typical cloud in-
frastructure. After that, we present a simplified scenario from the cloud case
study and discuss how we model the different components, summarising them
for better visibility as an informal graphical representation of the model. As a
cloud environment is a very dynamic system, quite some attention is devoted
to the modelling of processes, which is the main force of achieving the dynamic
behaviour. Finally, we present the attack generation from the model.
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As mentioned earlier, cloud infrastructures are typically complex and dynamic.
The success of cloud infrastructure is exactly in this dynamic and flexible struc-
ture. At the same time, however, this flexibility of the interconnections between
physical and virtual machines makes risk assessment a hard task. There are
studies highlighting the risks and threats in such environments [ENI09; Clo10].
While there is quite a history of network models in security, these models have
generally been limited to the technical parts of an organisation’s infrastructure,
typically representing computer networks and hops of an attacker from one node
to another.
Together with the human factor the cloud infrastructures become even more
sophisticated socio-technical systems and thus their risk assessment even more
complicated. Using our approach, one can model the typical components of
a cloud environment, for example, switches, routers, physical servers, virtual
machines, infrastructure details like buildings, rooms, doors, etc [Nid+15]. The
model includes also the connectivity relations among those components as well
as any access control.
Below we set the scene by shortly presenting a typical structure of a cloud
environment. For a better overview, we describe the cloud infrastructure in
three layers:
• Technical layer, which includes three sublayers: hardware (servers, stor-
age, internal and external network connections), virtualisation (hypervi-
sors, virtual machines, network and storage components together with
their configurations) and software (operating systems, middleware, appli-
cations and services).
• Physical layer is of course closely related to the technical layer. It repre-
sents the physical connections of the elements mentioned above. Respec-
tively, it consists of buildings, rooms and the respective access control.
• Social layer considers the social and human factor.
6.1.1 Scenario
In this section we apply our modelling approach to the scenario presented in Fig-
ure 6.1. The physical infrastructure consists of two rooms and a hallway. Doors
connect the outside world with the hallway, the hallway with the internal room
and the internal room with the data centre, respectively. Both rooms have a
window.
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WindowInternal	  
Figure 6.1: Highly simplified scenario of a private cloud environment with
various actors.
In the data centre there is a physical server on which there are two virtual
machines running (VM1 and VM2 ) together with a switch SW1 and a firewall
VFW, all on top of a hypervisor.
Our actors include Sydney, Terry, Finn, and Ethan. Sydney is a system admin-
istrator in the IT support, who not surprisingly has full logical access to the
whole cloud infrastructure. Terry is a technician in the IT support, and thus
has a physical access to the data centre. Finn works as a part of the finance
department, which uses VM2 for their work. Finally, Ethan is a member of the
organised crime department.
6.1.2 Modelling
We relate the elements of the cloud environment to the components in our model
as described below. The hardware elements like physical servers and routers
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Figure 6.2: Abstract representation of the system model of the cloud scenario.
The directed edges correspond to physical connections, and the
undirected ones correspond to logical connections. The white rect-
angles represent locations, while the grey rectangles represent ac-
tors. The circles represent data. The actors have different items or
data in their tuple space. The dashed rectangles at the upper right
corner of some of the nodes represent policy labels (see below for
the corresponding policy definitions). The grey squares connected
with dotted lines are the processes at each network location.
are modelled as items, each of which has a location. Items, as for example,
the computer in the internal room is an item stored in the tuple space of the
internal room. Similarly, the virtual components are modelled also as locations.
For example, each of the virtual machines VM1 and VM2 is modelled as a
location in the tuple space of the physical server SW1 it is running on. Here in
addition, as we will see later, processes come into the picture and processes are
associated/executed on certain locations.
Elements from the physical infrastructure are naturally modelled as locations.
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The access control is expressed using policies.
The actors in the model are modelled as they appear in the scenario: initially
Finn, Ethan and Sydney are located in the internal room, while Terry is in the
data centre.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the system model of the scenario described above in Sec-
tion 6.1.1. All actors have roles assigned to them, which are not shown in the
model, but can be used in policies to control access for actors belonging to a
specific group, i.e., having a specific role assigned.
Each network node has policies and processes assigned. The policies are used
to represent who can communicate to that node and what form the messages
should be in. The processes represent handling of IP traffic, and define how the
node should react when triggered by a specific message format.
Policy Modelling. In our example from Figure 6.2, the SW1 node represents
a switch that can communicate with the nodes VM1, VM2, and V FW .
The respective policies are defined as follows:
PLCSW1 := {VM1 |VM2 |VM3 |VFW : out}
PLCVM1 := {SW1 : out(“IP”, , , , , )}
PLCVM2 := {SW1 : out(“IP”, , , , , )}
PLCVFW := {SW1 |SW2 : out}
PLCDI := {key : move}
PLCDC := {card [(pin,X )], pin(X ) : move}
PLCSW1 allows the three virtual machines and the virtual firewall V FW on
Server1 to output at the switch SW1 . For readability reasons we use the symbol
| which works as a disjunct; it is not part of the policy specification language;
in principle we should define one policy per disjunct. PLCVM1 and PLCVM2
express that the switch SW1 is allowed to output at each of the respective
virtual machines. In other words, the switch communicates internally with each
of the virtual machines.
On the physical layer, the access through the door to the internal room is re-
stricted by a key lock, while the access to the data centre is restricted by a card
and the corresponding pin code for that card.
Process Modelling. As said above, the cloud case study represents a rather
dynamic environment, whose flexibility needs to be modelled. We model the
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dynamics of the cloud environment by defining processes. For the processes
in this section we allow for general tuples, as in standard Klaim [DFP98b], to
model network traffic.
The processes in the cloud case study can be classified in two main categories:
processes that represent handling of IP traffic, and processes that represent
hypervisor functionality, e.g., the migration of virtual machines.
In a more simplistic world a process usually triggers certain actions. In our case,
however, it is more complicated, resulting in a process triggering another pro-
cess. Therefore, network traffic is modelled as a sequence of processes triggered
on the various nodes along a route. A service is represented as the final process
in the chain, i.e., at the destination node, which triggers some computation and
the produced return message.
In order to illustrate the process modelling let’s assume that VM1 and VM2
have IP addresses 192.167.1.1 and 192.167.1.2, respectively. Both of them are
part of the network 192.167.1.0/24, and, as Figure 6.2 shows, are connected by
a switch SW1 with a default gateway on V FW .
A packet is represented by a tuple with 6 elements: a tag “IP”, the source
address and the source port, the destination address and port, and the message.
Of course this is adjustable according to the scenario in question. The ∼ is an
operator representing the matching of the addresses, which works similarly to
pattern matching.
A process running at the VM1 (PVM1 ) would look like this:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr, !dstPort, !msg) @VM1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @SW1
The processes at VM2 (PVM2 ) is similar:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr, !dstPort, !msg) @VM2.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @SW1
At the switch (PSW1 ), there are three processes, which would then look like
this:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, 192.167.1.1, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, 192.167.1.1, dstPort,msg) @VM1 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, 192.167.1.2, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, 192.167.1.2, dstPort,msg) @VM2 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @V FW
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The data routing uses the general IP routing method, where the destination
network is matched and the traffic is replicated to the next hop. In case several
paths are possible, the traffic will be sent through all available (acyclic) paths.
Routing is modelled using the worst-case assumption; assuming any acyclic path
might be taken. Processes are ordered by destination addresses, thus the first
match is the route taken.
Even though hubs are not widely used nowadays, we would like to shortly discuss
the difference between hubs and switches when it comes to defining the processes.
Modelling hubs would allow more conservative risk assessment. On the one
hand, a switch knows the destination address, i.e., where to send the packet
to. On the other hand, a hub passes all the traffic to all the directly connected
devices without caring about the destination address. It is then the devices that
check the destination address of the packets and accept only those which are
meant for them.
With the above being said, a process at a hub would look like the following:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 192.167.1.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @HUB.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @{VM1, V M2} |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr, !dstPort, !msg) @HUB.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @V FW
The notion out(t)@{l1, l2, ..., ln} represents that the tuple is output to all the
locations mentioned inbetween the curly brackets.
Firewalls play an essential role in network security. Normally a firewall sepa-
rates not only inside from outside, but also defines sections within a network.
Similarly to walls in a building, their main function is to isolate a particular
section, thus limiting the scope of a potential damage.
Recently, a firewall implements much more functionality than simple allow/deny
access rules based on a protocol, an address, and a port. Nowadays, a firewall
goes beyond its classical application, providing various services like NAT, load
balancing, and even routing. Deep-packet inspection, protocol validation, ex-
ternal black-lists, and HTTP header filtering are also useful services of modern
firewalls.
While all the above services affect network security, for simplicity reasons, in this
chapter we focus on the traditional firewall functionality, which allows or denies
access given a protocol, a source and destination address, and a port. Adding
the additional features of a firewall would require more granular modelling using
processes similar to the ones regarding the routing described above.
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We present two ways of modelling a firewall. In the first one, the firewall is
modelled as a natural extension of a router. Before showing the process defining
the firewall, for a better comparison, we present the process definition describing
a switch.
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.0.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @VM1 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.1.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @VM2
In the above, all traffic received for either of the attached networks will be
repeated to the destination network. Now with a slight modification of the pro-
cess definition above, we can express the firewall functionality by, for example,
blocking the incoming traffic to 10.0.1.0/24:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.0.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @VM1 |
in (“IP”, 192.167.1.2, 80, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.0.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“IP”, 192.167.1.2, 80, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @VM2 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.1.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @SW1.
out (“DENIED”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @SW1
The second way to model a firewall would look like this:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr ∼ 10.0.1.0/24, !srcPort, !dstAddr, !dstPort, !msg) @V FW1.
out (“SENT”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort) @V FW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @SW2 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !dstAddr ∼ 10.0.1.0/24, !dstPort, !msg) @V FW1.
read (“SENT”, dstAddr, dstPort, srcAddr, srcPort) @V FW1.
out (“IP”, srcAddr, srcPort, dstAddr, dstPort,msg) @SW1
The first process above records the outgoing traffic. The constant “SENT” is
output at V FW1 together with the destination address and port so the fire-
wall keeps track of which destinations packages have been sent to. The second
process represents the incoming traffic. The firewall checks whether packages
have been previously sent to the received destination address and port. This
allows to model the functionality of the firewall, which accepts replies only to
sent messages.
As for the migration of virtual machines, it is exactly the hypervisor, which is
responsible for it. Below is a process definition running on Hypervisor1 (PHV1 ):
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort,HV 1, HV 1Port, (“migrate”, !vmname, !targethv)) @HV 1.
in ((vmname, !vmloc)) @HV 1
out (“IP”, srcAddr, targethv, (“migrated”, vmname, vmloc)) @HV 1 |
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort, !target, !targetPort, !msg) @FVW.
out (“IP”, “HV 1”, target,msg) @SW2
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When the hypervisor receives a migrate command with a virtual machine name
and a target server, it inputs the location of that virtual machine, serialises the
virtual machine and sends a message to the target hypervisor.
Finally, at the target hypervisor, when a message for a migrated virtual machine
is received, together with its name and location, the target hypervisor outputs
the virtual machine at the specified location:
in (“IP”, !srcAddr, !srcPort,HV 1, HV 1Port, (“migrated”, !vmname, !vmloc)) @HV 1.
out ((vnname, vmloc)) @HV 1
6.1.3 Attack Generation
In cloud environments, there are various categories of attacks, among others:
stealing of confidential data, corrupt business operations or financial gains.
In practice, as many of the devices are sophisticated and flexible, nearly each of
them could be an entry point of an attack, once an actor gains access to their
console and has knowledge about the administrative password.
For simplicity, in our scenario from Figure 6.1, we define as a goal gaining access
to a confidential document fileX.
Using the policy specification language described in Section 3.3 the goal would
be defined as:
not({fileX }@{outside})
The XML file used as an input describing the scenario presented in Section 6.1.1
(see also Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2) can be seen in Appendix B. Since the actors
Sidney and Terry have similar access rights, the respective attack trees generated
for each of them are very similar. Analogical is the case with the actors Finn and
Ethan. Due to their size, we show in Figure 6.3 only the attack tree generated
for Terry since it is the smallest one. We would like to note that the leaves of
the attack tree (i.e., the basic actions) are not including details since they come
from an attack pattern library. The further refinement of the actions results in
a more detailed attack tree, which is naturally larger. The refinement of the
attack tree shown below appeared to be too large to be readable in the hard
copy version of this dissertation, therefore it can only be seen in the on-line
version (after a significant zoom-in).
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attacker Terry get ids
get fileX at some location
goto item VM1 get fileX
get asset fileX
goto item Server1 get VM1
get asset VM1
goto RoomDatacenter and get Server1
IN Terry ITEM Server1 Server1 LOCATION RoomDatacenter RoomDatacenter
IN Terry ITEM VM1 VM1 ITEM Server1 Server1
IN Terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM VM1 VM1
goto item Switch1 get fileX
get asset fileX
goto RoomInternal and get Switch1
IN Terry ITEM Switch1 Switch1 LOCATION RoomInternal RoomInternal
IN Terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM Switch1 Switch1
goto item Laptop get fileX
get asset fileX
goto RoomInternal and get Laptop
IN Terry ITEM Laptop Laptop LOCATION RoomInternal RoomInternal
IN Terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM Laptop Laptop
goto item Switch2 get fileX
get asset fileX
goto RoomDatacenter and get Switch2
IN Terry ITEM Switch2 Switch2 LOCATION RoomDatacenter RoomDatacenter
IN Terry DATA fileX fileX ITEM Switch2 Switch2
Figure 6.3: An attack tree generated for the actor Terry as a potential attacker.
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6.2 Comparison with Related Work
After presenting the concepts of our approach, and applying it on the cloud
case study scenario, here we relate our concepts to the related work presented
in Chapter 2.
6.2.1 Representation
There are two main categories found to represent models: graphical and textual.
The graphical representation can be divided in trees, graphs, diagrams, and
maps, with the former two having clear mathematical properties that support
formal analyses. Diagrams and maps help to communicate models to tool users.
Plain textual representations are mainly used as an input for tools. An optimal
model representation is probably a hybrid of these approaches. Our model is
XML-based; this textual representation can be visualised by standard tools.
6.2.2 Infrastructure
All of the studies directly addressing modelling approaches are able to model
the digital layer of the infrastructure. About half of them model the physical
infrastructure as well. Only few studies reflect the social layer of the system
infrastructure. In addition, most of the studies model only the attacker who
traverses the system acquiring knowledge and/or access on the way. Our model
expresses all three layers, and it is also able to adapt to the existing approaches.
6.2.3 Assets and Containment
All models support assets on the different levels considered. Some studies only
consider information, all other include physical and to some extent digital arte-
facts.
Containment is only addressed by a few studies. The studies that are able to
model an actor at a location, are also able to model the nesting of objects.
Some studies provide a different notion of containment in the sense of annota-
tion/quantification properties, e.g., hosts containing vulnerabilities.
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Our model can represent assets such as data and items. The model represents
containment through location attributes; containment can be arbitrarily deep.
6.2.4 Processes, Actions and Behaviour
All studies agree on the definition of a process as a sequence of steps. Most
studies only mention the existence of processes as part of the model. However,
some models provide explicit support for processes.
In most studies, actions relate to the digital domain varying from specific actions
such as Read and Out to “all computing” in general.
Behaviour relates to the social domain, where human actors perform actions
within the model. Human behaviour involves all attacker behaviour that is
needed to achieve a goal and more specific behaviour like moving between loca-
tions or starting a process on a computer. Using human behaviour as a general,
non-restricted concept provides flexibility. On the other hand, a restricted set
of actions enables formal treatment and analysis. A trade-off should allow the
freedom to model human behaviour in a proper way, and also be able to be
formally checked.
Our system model also has a natural support for processes, and supports actions
and behaviour through the underlying process calculus.
6.2.5 Actors
Most of the studies focus on insiders as they have better access and knowledge.
Some of the studies do not distinguish between insiders and outsiders. Few stud-
ies do not even distinguish between humans and non-humans in the modelling
phase. In real life attackers can collaborate; only few of the studies are able to
represent this. One study does not even model actors or a potential attacker,
but analyses the context for possible information leakage without specific attack
scenario involving an actor. Only two studies model attacks carried out by more
than one attacker, i.e., by collaborating attackers.
In our model we do not distinguish between insiders and outsiders. They could
differ in their knowledge about the organisation. However, at this stage we do
not support collaborating actors.
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6.2.6 Policies
Most of the studies take into consideration only low level policies in terms of
accessibility/reachability. While considering high level (organisational policies)
is essential, it could also be problematic in case of inconsistencies between low
and high level policies. One study pays close attention to this problem and
derives attack scenarios from analysing the policies on different levels.
Our policy-specification language enables the reasoning about policies and their
relationship; especially contradictions between and holes in policies are of inter-
est, since they may enable attacks.
6.2.7 Quantitative Measures
A number of studies support quantitative annotations to annotate the model
and attack. Those that are most frequently supported are: probability that
an attack will succeed and the costs of an attack. The supported annotations
are mainly properties of an attacker or actions, e.g., required skill and risk of
detection, however there are also some organisational properties, e.g., impact of
an attack.
Our model supports quantitative annotations through unique identifiers for all
model elements. These identifiers enable the mapping from elements to proper-
ties through the knowledge-base.
6.2.8 Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
Only few of the studies provide vulnerabilities as an input to the model. Usually
they are described by domain experts and are based on previous attacks. The
most frequently used attack representation is a sequence of actions. While it
gives a high overview and is easy to understand by non-experts, it has a flat
structure and thus does not provide many details. The other popular representa-
tion is attack trees, presenting threats in a hierarchical structure; however, they
loose the sequential notion. Another disadvantage of attack trees (or in some
studies referred to as attack patterns) is that they cannot reflect interactions
between different attacks.
The model described in this dissertation represents vulnerabilities and counter-
measures through qualitative properties in the knowledge-base.
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6.3 Concluding Remarks
In this section we discuss some questions regarding granularity and properties
of the system model with regards to the cloud case study.
Similarly to the discussion in Section 5.5.2, the granularity of the model depends
on the modeller. For simplicity, we have not introduced, for example, the power
supply or cooling in the system model of the cloud scenario. However, doing so
would result in additional alternative attack vectors.
There is a very subtle borderline when it comes to whether an asset should
be represented as data or as an item. For example, in Section 6.1.2 we have
modelled each of the virtual machines as a tuple (VM1, hypervisor1) which
expresses a virtual machine as an item located at a location hypervisor1. In
reality, a virtual machine is not tangible and not persistent (when in memory).
On the other hand, if we had modelled the virtual machine as data, then we
would have lost the notion of tuple space, which is necessary for the processes.
We remind the reader that in process calculus the process actions operate on
tuple spaces (except for the creation which works on nodes).
At the same time, in Section 3.6 we have also modelled a payment card as a
tuple (card, Charlie), i.e., expressing it as an item at an actor location Charlie.
Even though it is modelled exactly in the same way as the virtual machine, in
reality the card is both tangible and persistent.
Another example is the file from the scenario presented in Section 6.1. The file
on VM1 is modelled as data (formally presented as a tuple (fileX, 42)). While
being digital, the information in the file is not tangible and persistent. However,
assume we have the following process definition:
in (“print”, !data) @VM1.
out (data) @room
In the first part of the process, when acquiring the data from the virtual machine
VM1, data itself is not tangible and not persistent. However, the moment the
data is printed on paper, it becomes both tangible and persistent. We should
note that in this case it might become problematic for the attack generation
technique we propose.
Drilling down into more details, we would need to express, for example, a process
representing establishment of an ssh tunnel. For this the user would need more
advanced modelling. In principle there is a potential to use macros and define
patterns of processes. While this can be a future direction for investigation, it
is also slightly slipping away from our scope.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation we have explored how to combine social and technical vul-
nerabilities of organisations by means of applying a system modelling approach
to socio-technical systems. We have devised a process-algebraic language that
naturally facilitates an analytical identification of attacks in the form of attack
trees. Our initial thesis was that
applying a formal modelling approach to the study of socio-technical systems
allows to develop algorithms for the automated identification of complex attacks
that exploit the interplay between technological and social vulnerabilities.
Below we summarise the contributions of this dissertation, showing how our
developments support the claim above. Then we describe how this work is
placed in the wider landscape of the TRESPASS project. Finally, we highlight
directions for future investigation.
Presenting an organisation as a socio-technical system. In many of the
studies we examined in our literature review, attacks are mostly concerning the
technical aspect, neglecting the physical infrastructure and the human aspect.
Due to the complex nature of organisational attacks, it is essential to encompass
all the aforementioned components in a single model to be able to properly
identify threats that are neither purely technical, nor purely social. Therefore,
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our work rests on the basic premise, that organisations should be modelled as
socio-technical systems.
Socio-technical systems can be expressed by formal languages. We
introduced some modifications to a variant of the Klaim language, which gave
us the possibility to formalise socio-technical systems. We also defined our
policy-specification language which is simple, yet highly expressive. By having
socio-technical systems expressed by a formal language, we enable the possibility
to conduct automated threat analysis by using policy invalidation.
Organisational vulnerabilities can be identified analytically. Using for-
mal system models, our approach systematically identifies the necessary steps
to invalidate policies that are supposed to hold in the modelled system. We
formalise attack tree generation including human factors. While the notion of
“human factor” could be stronger, our approach is flexible enough to support
all kinds of human factors that can be instantiated once an attack has been
identified. The generated attacks include all relevant steps, from detecting the
required assets, obtaining them, and any credentials needed to do so, and finally
performing actions that are prohibited in the system. The generated attacks are
precise enough to illustrate the threat, and they are general enough to hide the
details of individual steps.
Analytical threat analysis is more exhaustive than brainstorming.
Current risk assessment methods are heavily dependent on the defender’s abil-
ity to conceive and define potential attack opportunities in order to prevent
them. Even though this approach has proven to work in not too volatile worlds,
with the dynamic attack landscape nowadays, this approach is often too slow
and over-challenges the human imaginative capabilities. With the framework
we have proposed, it is no longer a strong requirement to have security experts
manually perform threat analysis based on experience.
There is a way to overcome the gap between academia and industry.
We have successfully evaluated our approach on two case studies provided by in-
dustry. While both case studies are in different domains, our proposed technique
is expressive and flexible enough to fully address the challenges of identifying
socio-technical vulnerabilities.
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7.1 The socio-technical security model in the con-
text of the TRESPASS project
Risk assessment methods demand tool support to predict, prioritise and prevent
complex attack scenarios analytically. This is exactly the core of the TRESPASS
project [TREsPASS]. In this dissertation we have presented a modelling frame-
work based on socio-technical security system models, which have a central role
in the technical part of the TRESPASS project. They constitute the interface
between the organisation being modelled and the analysis and visualisation tools
developed by the other partners in TRESPASS.
Being part of the TRESPASS project, the research in this thesis was also aligned
with the overall goal of the project, and more precisely synchronised with the
parts closely related to the model.
The work described in this thesis is an essential piece of the TRESPASS “puz-
zle”, where the risk assessment framework as a whole is the one with the real
value. In this section we outline and discuss the relation of our modelling ap-
proach together with the attack generation technique we have presented in this
dissertation to the TRESPASS project.
The methodology proposed in this dissertation consists of three major phases:
• describing an organisation as a socio-technical security system model
• with a given goal, identify all the attack vectors from an initial state of
the model
• gathering the attack vectors in an attack tree
Figure 7.1 shows the relations of the different major components in the TRES-
PASS project, where the system model serves as an entry point to the complete
risk assessment framework. A good overview of the TRESPASS project can also
be found at [PWP15]. The work in this thesis fully covers the Model section
in Figure 7.1 as well as partially the attack identification in terms of generating
attack trees based on the system model and a certain goal.
As mentioned earlier, the generated attacks do not consider any attacker prop-
erties like skills, resources or motivation. Instead, different attacker profiles are
introduced based on agent modelling [Cas07; Ros10]. The usage of the attacker
profiles simplifies the attack identification given the system model (as opposed
to, for example, defining the actors’ behaviour as a component in the system
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Figure 7.1: The machinery of the TRESPASS project
model). As a consequence it also enables the simplification of the defenders.
It is easier to identify the relevant countermeasures according to the different
threat levels.
A risk assessment framework without countermeasure analysis would be useless.
The automation of the at ack tr es gen ation allows for t fur her analysis and
identification of relevant countermeasures. The analysis phase in Figure 7.1 esti-
mates the impact of the attack vectors. Various quantitative analysis techniques
have been proposed by TRESPASS partners, assigning quantitative metrics to
th basic acti ns of an attack tree and propag i g t o t roo of the t ee.
Based on the results of the aforementioned analyses, attack vectors are then
prioritised. We believe that a fully-automated framework is not possible and
it is actually not even needed. The user should intervene and decide which
actions to take in order to prevent given vulnerabilities based on the resources
and the cost of introducing them. Estimation of the pay-off of introducing a
certain countermeasure is highly context-dependent and requires human inter-
action. When decisions are made, the model can then be chang d accordingly
and a rerun of the analysis would reveal the updated state of the organisational
vulnerabilities.
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.8, the granularity on each of the modelling
layers can be adjusted depending on the kind of vulnerabilities the modeller is
interested in. Different classes of vulnerabilities require different levels of details
with regards to the modelling. The precision of the modelling directly affects
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the complexity of the attack tree generation.
To simplify the attack tree generation, we predefine certain standard sub-trees
expressing standard sub-goals. These sub-trees are not part of the automatic
attack tree generation, but instead are stored in attack pattern libraries and
later plugged-in [PWP15].
7.2 Future Directions
For a more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to the concluding remarks
following each of the chapters. In this section, on a higher-level, we highlight
some topics which would be beneficial for this dissertation.
A major restriction of the work presented in this dissertation is that the sys-
tem model is analysed and different attack vectors are derived from the model,
under the assumption that an entire attack is carried out by a single attacker.
In reality, it is often the case that an attack is performed by collaborating at-
tackers. As a result, attacks, which according to our current proposal might
seem infeasible after the qualitative analysis of the attack trees, would suddenly
turn out to have been dangerously neglected. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
enable collaborating attackers and be able to analyse the impact of an attack
considering combinations of skills, knowledge, etc. (i.e. attackers’ resources and
capabilities) of multiple attackers.
Obviously, building a fully secured system cannot be achieved, but combin-
ing our approach with the further analysis of the derived attack trees [AN15]
together with the “plug-and-play” attacker profiles [LWS14; Per14], establishes
bridges and invites for setting priorities and introducing actual countermeasures.
In recent studies the notion of countermeasures is introduced on a lower level,
generating attack-defence trees directly from the system model [Kor+12]. Since
this is another feasible approach, which potentially gives more flexibility (where
having iterations of changing the model and re-running the analysis remains
sensible), and considering, that the pure modelling part of our approach is inde-
pendent from the attack tree generation (i.e., it is rather flexible), it would be
interesting to investigate under which assumptions attack-defence trees could
be generated from our formal system model.
As mentioned earlier, there are studies exploring the reasoning about policy
inconsistencies, especially between policies on different levels (for example, lo-
cal access control policies and policies defining the organisational behaviour of
the employees). The design of our policy-specification language enables such
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reasoning, and it is definitely a direction worth exploring, since it can possibly
identify attacks originating from inconsistencies [PDP13b].
The target group has always been security practitioners, who should be able
to apply the machinery in practice, thus helping themselves in the cumbersome
and highly error prone manual attack identification process. For this, it is
desirable to provide a user-friendly implementation by enhancing our current
implementation with having a standard user interface for model development
and customised visualisation of the potential attacks.
Last but not least, it would be interesting to enable a qualitative comparison
with other risk assessment approaches.
Appendix A
The XML model structure
In this Appendix we describe in more details the XML format used for the im-
plementation. The description is based on [D3.4.1]. We start with the structure
of the scenario.
Scenario Each scenario is stored in different XML file which has the following
structure:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<scenario
xmlns="..."
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="..."
id="..."
author="..."
date="..."
version="...">
<model>test/TREsPASS_model.xml</model>
<goal>
...
</goal>
</scenario>
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Here, <model> refers to a model to be analysed, and <goal> is a policy, which
is expected to be enforced system-wide.
Model A model mentioned in the scenario has the following overall structure.
Each of the components are further described below.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<system
xmlns="..."
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="..."
author="..."
date="..."
version="...">
<title>...</title>
<locations>...</locations>
<edges>...</edges>
<assets>...</assets>
<actors>...</actors>
<roles>...</roles>
<predicates>...</predicates>
<policies>...</policies>
<processes>...</processes>
</system>
The general structure of the model description looks as follows: The title element
is a string presenting the name of the model. For example:
<title>IPTV model</title>
Locations The <locations> section describes the locations associated with
the model. Each location has an identifier (so that policies can be associated
with locations) and a domain. There are two types of domains: physical and
network, with the idea that capability to move around in one domain does not
automatically mean moving around in the other (e.g., humans can not move in
a network and programs/processes in the physical world).
Example:
<locations>
<location id="Home" domain="physical" />
<location id="Computer C" domain="network" />
</locations>
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Edges The <edges> section describes existing connections between the lo-
cations. Each <edge> will have a <source> and <target>. <source> and
<target> may be either an explicitly defined <location> or <item> from the
<assets> declarations.
Example:
<edges>
<edge>
<source>home</source>
<target>city</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>PC</source>
<target>Voting_server</target>
</edge>
</edges>
Assets The <assets> section describes the items and data relevant to the
model. <item> is something that one can physically have and/or move around
(payment card, PC, money). <data> represents a piece of knowledge and/or
digital asset (PIN, password, cryptographic key, value of a vote). Computer
programs are not typically assets, but rather <processes> running at some
items (like PC) or locations (like network servers that one can not physically
access).
Assets also have (initial) locations associated with them. These are the places
where the assets are expected to be located. It is neither necessary, nor advisable
to try to express all the possible locations in the model, since this is handled
by the attack generation procedure, taking into account the <edges> between
locations and the respective <policies>. The <atLocations> element may
contain a list of locations separated by white spaces.
It is important to note that the <atLocations> tag may also list other objects
than just the ones declared as <locations>. <actors> and <items> may also
serve as locations for other items or data ( i.e., containment property).
Every asset needs to have a unique id, since there may be various assets with
the same name (card, PIN), so the id can be used to distinguish between them.
The asset name can also be interpreted as its type. In general, attribute id is
used when a unique object reference is needed, and attribute name is used when
different objects may have the same reference.
Example:
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<assets>
<item name="Card" id="x001">
<atLocations>Home</atLocations>
</item>
<data name="PIN" id="x009">
<atLocations>Alice Card</atLocations>
</data>
</assets>
Actors The <actors> section describes the actors relevant to the model. An
<actor> may be <atLocations> which is again a whitespace-separated list of
locations. And again, this list is meant to be just the initial list of locations (of
which there may quite possibly be just one) which the attack generation tool
must be able to take care of moving the actors around in the model.
Example:
<actors>
<actor id="Alice">
<atLocations>home</atLocations>
</actor>
<actor id="Charlie">
<atLocations>city</atLocations>
</actor>
</actors>
Roles Many access control policies are actually stated in the terms of roles.
To capture that concept, <roles> may also be declared in the model. A role
has a unique id and possibly several persons (referenced by <actorID>) being
assigned this role.
Example:
<roles>
<role id="customer">
<actors>
<actorID>Alice</actorID>
</actors>
</role>
<role id="care taker">
<actors>
<actorID>Fred</actorID>
<actorID>Charlie</actorID>
</actors>
</role>
</roles>
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Predicates The <predicates> section describes different predicates that hold
between the actors. Predicates in the model are not predefined, so the attack
generation will just generate a node stating “Fulfil the predicate . . . ” and further
expansion of this node must come from the Attack Pattern Library.
Example:
<predicates>
<predicate name="trusts">
<parameterID>Alice</parameterID>
<parameterID>care taker</parameterID>
</predicate>
</predicates>
Note that the parameters of a predicate may have different types (Alice is an
<actor>, whereas care taker is a <role>), so attack generation has to take
this into account.
Policies The <policies> section defines policies that enable certain actions
or access to some locations, assuming certain preconditions are met.
A policy consists of three parts: <credentials>, <enabledActions> and
<atLocations> declarations. <credentials> describe preconditions that have
to be met in order for the policy to allow an action at certain locations. A
credential may comprise of one or several of the following:
• be at a certain location,
• be a certain actor,
• have a certain role,
• possess a certain asset (either item of data),
• fulfil a predicate.
Enabled actions may be one of the following:
• i: input data,
• r: read data,
• o: output data,
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• m: move an actor or a process,
• e: execute a process.
The <atLocations> tag refers to the location where this policy is applied. It
is important to understand the difference between the <credLocation> and
<atLocations> tags. The former refers to a precondition expressed in the form
of being at a location ( e.g., in the room that has a door), the latter refers
to the actual location of policy enforcement ( e.g., the door). It is likely that
<atLocations> will often be referring to “virtual” locations that do not corre-
spond directly to our everyday understanding of the term ’location’.
<credItem> and <credPredicate> may have arguments.
<credItem> may have either one or several <credData> or <credItem> in-
stances attached to it. <credData> may either refer to an explicit <value>
or <variable>. ]
Similarly, <credPredicate> may have one or more <argument> tabs which in
turn may either contain an explicit <value> (which must refer to a valid id) or
a variable.
Variables are unified by name across different occurrences, and hence provide a
way of binding different model components to each other.
Example:
<policies>
<policy>
<credentials>
<credLocation id="..."/>
<credActor id="..."/>
<credRole id="..."/>
<credItem name="card">
<argument>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>X</variable>
</credData>
</argument>
</credItem>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>X</variable>
</credData>
<credPredicate name="isActor">
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<argument>
<value>Margrethe</value>
</argument>
</credPredicate>
</credentials>
<enabledActions>...</enabledActions>
<atLocations>...</atLocations>
</policy>
</policies>
Processes The <processes> section describes the processes running in the
model. A <process> runs at (a) certain location(s). After receiving a <signal>
(say, as an output of an action run after a successful policy evaluation) it waits
for some <inputs> and after receiving them, gives the corresponding <outputs>.
Example:
<processes>
<process id="Encryption">
<atLocations>PC</atLocations>
<signal>
Encrypt
</signal>
<inputs>
<input datatype="vote">X</input>
<input>Serv_Pub_Key</input>
<input>owner</input>
</inputs>
<outputs>
<output>Encrypted_vote</output>
<output>owner</output>
</outputs>
</process>
</processes>
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Appendix B
The tool input (XML)
/output (AT)
B.1 XML input
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<system
xmlns="https://www.trespass-project.eu/schemas/TREsPASS_model"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="https://www.trespass-project.eu/schemas/TREsPASS_model.xsd"
author="Marieta G ivanova"
date="11-01-2015"
version="2.0">
<title>Cloud infrastructure model</title>
<locations>
<!-- rooms in building -->
<location id="Outside"/>
<location id="DoorExternal"/>
<location id="Hallway"/>
<location id="DoorInternal"/>
<location id="RoomInternal"/>
<location id="WindowInternal"/>
<location id="DoorDatacenter"/>
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<location id="RoomDatacenter"/>
<location id="WindowDatacenter"/>
</locations>
<edges>
<!-- connectivity building -->
<edge>
<source>Outside</source><target>DoorExternal</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>DoorExternal</source><target>Hallway</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>Hallway</source><target>Outside</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>Hallway</source><target>DoorInternal</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>DoorInternal</source><target>RoomInternal</target>
</edge>
<edge>
<source>RoomInternal</source><target>Hallway</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>RoomInternal</source><target>WindowInternal</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>Outside</source><target>WindowInternal</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>RoomInternal</source><target>DoorDatacenter</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>DoorDatacenter</source><target>RoomDatacenter</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>WindowDatacenter</source><target>RoomDatacenter</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>Hallway</source><target>WindowDatacenter</target>
</edge>
<!-- connectivity cyber -->
<edge directed="false">
<source>Laptop</source><target>Switch1</target>
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</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>Switch1</source><target>Server1</target>
</edge>
<!-- connectivity switch -->
<edge directed="false">
<source>Server1</source><target>Switch2</target>
</edge>
<edge directed="false">
<source>Server2</source><target>Switch2</target>
</edge>
</edges>
<assets>
<item name="idcard" id="x002">
<atLocations>Sydney</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="idcard" id="x003">
<atLocations>Terry</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="idcard" id="x004">
<atLocations>Ethan</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="idcard" id="x005">
<atLocations>Finn</atLocations>
</item>
<!-- cyber infrastructure -->
<item name="Laptop" id="Laptop">
<atLocations>RoomInternal</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="Switch1" id="Switch1">
<atLocations>RoomInternal</atLocations>
</item>
<!-- cyber infrastructure server 1-->
<item name="Server1" id="Server1">
<atLocations>RoomDatacenter</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="Switch2" id="Switch2">
<atLocations>RoomDatacenter</atLocations>
</item>
<!-- cyber infrastructure server 2-->
<item name="Server2" id="Server2">
<atLocations>RoomDatacenter</atLocations>
</item>
<item name="VM1" id="VM1">
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<atLocations>Server1</atLocations>
</item>
<data name="pin" id="x006" value="1">
<atLocations>Sydney x002</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="pin" id="x007" value="2">
<atLocations>Terry x003</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="pin" id="x008" value="3">
<atLocations>Ethan x004</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="pin" id="x009" value="4">
<atLocations>Finn x005</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="owner" id="x010" value="Sydney">
<atLocations>x002</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="owner" id="x011" value="Terry">
<atLocations>x003</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="owner" id="x012" value="Ethan">
<atLocations>x004</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="owner" id="x013" value="Finn">
<atLocations>x005</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="fileX" id="fileX" value="42">
<atLocations>VM1 Laptop Switch1 Switch2</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="password" id="pwdethan" value="1234">
<atLocations>Ethan</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="password" id="pwdsydney" value="2345">
<atLocations>Sydney</atLocations>
</data>
<data name="password" id="admpwdsydney" value="3456">
<atLocations>Sydney</atLocations>
</data>
</assets>
<actors>
<actor id="Finn">
<atLocations>Outside</atLocations>
</actor>
<actor id="Ethan">
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<atLocations>Outside</atLocations>
</actor>
<actor id="Sydney">
<atLocations>Outside</atLocations>
</actor>
<actor id="Terry">
<atLocations>Outside</atLocations>
</actor>
</actors>
<policies>
<policy id="p001">
<credentials>
<credItem name="idcard">
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credItem>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credentials>
<enabled><move /></enabled>
<atLocations>DoorExternal</atLocations>
</policy>
<policy id="p002">
<credentials>
<credItem name="idcard">
<credData name="owner">
<variable>X</variable>
</credData>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credItem>
<credPredicate name="role">
<value>employee</value>
<variable>X</variable>
</credPredicate>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credentials>
<enabled><move /></enabled>
<atLocations>DoorInternal</atLocations>
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</policy>
<policy id="p003">
<credentials>
<credItem name="idcard">
<credData name="owner">
<variable>X</variable>
</credData>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credItem>
<credPredicate name="role">
<value>administrator</value>
<variable>X</variable>
</credPredicate>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credentials>
<enabled><move /></enabled>
<atLocations>DoorDatacenter</atLocations>
</policy>
<policy id="p004">
<credentials>
<credItem name="idcard">
<credData name="owner">
<variable>X</variable>
</credData>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credItem>
<credPredicate name="role">
<value>technician</value>
<variable>X</variable>
</credPredicate>
<credData name="pin">
<variable>Y</variable>
</credData>
</credentials>
<enabled><move /></enabled>
<atLocations>DoorDatacenter</atLocations>
</policy>
<policy id="p005">
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<credentials>
<credData name="password">
<value>1234</value>
</credData>
</credentials>
<enabled><in /></enabled>
<atLocations>VM1 Laptop</atLocations>
</policy>
</policies>
<processes>
</processes>
<predicates>
<predicate id="role" arity="2">
<value>administrator Sydney</value>
<value>technician Terry</value>
<value>accountant Finn</value>
<value>investigator Ethan</value>
<value>employee Finn</value>
<value>employee Ethan</value>
<value>employee Sydney</value>
<value>employee Terry</value>
</predicate>
<predicate id="isPassword" arity="3">
<value>vm1 Ethan pwdethan</value>
<value>laptop Ethan pwdethan</value>
<value>laptop Sydney pwdsydney</value>
<value>hypervisor1 Sydney admpwdsydney</value>
</predicate>
</predicates>
</system>
B.2 Generated Attack Tree
In the following pages, we show the attack tree for the actor Ethan as a potential
attacker. Unfortunately, the labels of the nodes are not readable in the hard
copy, but they can be seen in the digital version of this dissertation together
with the refined version of the attack tree.
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Figure B.1: An attack tree generated for the actor Ethan as a potential at-
tacker.
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Figure B.2: An attack tree generated for the actor Ethan as a potential at-
tacker including the APL refinement.
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Appendix C
The Isabelle Theory
theory enables
imports Main
begin
datatype action = get | move | eval |put
datatype actor = Actor string
type_synonym policy = "((actor ⇒ bool) × action set)"
datatype location = Location nat
datatype node = NA actor | NL location
datatype graph = Graph "(node × node)set"
datatype infrastructure = Infrastructure "graph" "location ⇒ policy set"
"actor ⇒ bool"
primrec act :: "actor ⇒ string" where "act(Actor n) = n"
primrec loc :: "location ⇒ nat" where "loc(Location n) = n"
primrec gra :: "graph ⇒ (node × node)set" where "gra(Graph g) = g"
definition nodes_graph :: "graph ⇒ node set"
where "nodes_graph g ≡ { x. ∃ y. (x,y) ∈ gra g) ∨ (y,x) ∈ gra g }"
definition actors_graph :: "graph ⇒ actor set"
where "actors_graph g ≡ {x. ∃ y. NA(Actor y) : nodes_graph g ∧ x = Actor y}"
definition locs_graph :: "graph ⇒ location set"
where "locs_graph g ≡ {x. ∃ y. NL(Location y) ∈ nodes_graph g ∧ x = Location y}"
primrec graphI :: "infrastructure ⇒ graph"
where "graphI (Infrastructure g d c) = g"
primrec delta :: "[infrastructure, location] ⇒ policy set"
where "delta (Infrastructure g d c) = d"
primrec tspace :: "[infrastructure, actor] ⇒ bool"
where "tspace (Infrastructure g d c) = c"
primrec actorsI :: "infrastructure ⇒ actor set"
where "actorsI (Infrastructure g d c) = actors_graph g"
definition enables :: "[infrastructure, location, actor, action] ⇒ bool"
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where
"enables I l a a’ ≡ ∃ (c,e) ∈ delta I l. a’ ∈ e ∧ (tspace I a −→ c(a))"
definition ID :: "[actor, string] ⇒ bool"
where "ID a s ≡ (act a = s)"
consts data_expr :: "[’a × ’b] ⇒ bool"
consts card :: "[’a × ’b] ⇒ bool"
consts role :: "actor × string ⇒ bool"
definition inpred :: "[bool, bool] ⇒ bool" ("_ inp _" [50,50]50)
where "Q inp P ≡ (P −→ Q)"
(* Invalidation formula *)
definition inv_formula_ex :: "infrastructure ⇒ bool"
where "inv_formula_ex I ≡
∀ x ∈ actorsI I. ∀ y ∈ actorsI I.
(x 6= y ∧ (role(x, ’’employee’’) inp tspace I x) ∧
((card(’’owner’’,y) ∧ role(y,’’customer’’)) inp tspace I y))
−→ ¬(∃ t. enables I t x get)"
(* example infrastructure 1 = bank computer, 2 = home *)
definition ex_graph :: "graph"
where "ex_graph ≡ Graph (NA (Actor ’’Charly’’), NL (Location 1)),
(NL (Location 2), NL (Location 1)), (NA (Actor ’’Alice’’), NL (Location 2))"
definition ex_policy_bank :: "location ⇒ policy set"
where "ex_policy_bank ≡ (λ x. if x = Location 1 then
{(λ x. ∃ X :: nat. card(’’pin’’,X) ∧ data_expr(’’pin’’,X), {get})} else {})"
definition ex_creds :: "actor ⇒ bool"
where "ex_creds ≡ (λ x. if x = Actor ’’Charly’’ then
card(’’pin’’,42::nat) ∧ data_expr(’’pin’’,42::nat) ∧
role(Actor ’’Charly’’,’’employee’’)
else (card(’’owner’’,Actor ’’Alice’’) ∧ role(Actor ’’Alice’’,’’customer’’)))"
definition scenario_one :: "infrastructure"
where "scenario_one ≡ Infrastructure ex_graph ex_policy_bank ex_creds"
lemma ex_inv : "¬ inv_formula_ex scenario_one"
apply (simp add: inv_formula_ex_def scenario_one_def)
apply (rule_tac x = "Actor ’’Charly’’" in bexI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule_tac x = "Actor ’’Alice’’" in bexI)
apply (simp add: inv_formula_ex_def scenario_one_def
ex_creds_def ex_policy_bank_def ex_graph_def inpred_def)
apply (simp add: ex_graph_def actors_graph_def nodes_graph_def)
apply (rule_tac x = "Location 1" in exI)
apply (simp add: enables_def ex_creds_def ex_policy_bank_def ex_graph_def inpred_def)
apply (rule impI)
apply (rule_tac x = "42" in exI)
by (simp add: ex_graph_def actors_graph_def nodes_graph_def)+
end
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